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Abstract 
The adoption of new technologies on-farm is affected by socio-economic, risk 
management behavior, and market factors. The adoption of cellulosic biofuel feedstock 
enterprises and conservation practices plays an important role in the future of Kansas agriculture. 
No set markets currently exist for bioenergy feedstocks and farmers may be reluctant to produce 
the feedstocks without contracts to mitigate uncertainty and risk. Adoption of conservation 
practices to improve soil productivity and health may be affected by risk considerations also. The 
purpose of this dissertation is to study how market mechanisms and risk influence Kansas 
farmers’ willingness to adopt cellulosic biofuel feedstock enterprises and conservation practices 
on-farm. 
The first essay examines farmers’ willingness to grow switchgrass under contract using a 
stated choice approach. Data were collected using an enumerated survey of Kansas farmers and 
analyzed using latent class logistic regression models. Farmers whose primary enterprise is 
livestock are less inclined to grow switchgrass. In addition, shorter contracts, greater harvest 
flexibility, crop insurance, and cost-share assistance increase the likelihood farmers will grow 
switchgrass. 
The second essay examines how farmers’ risk perceptions impact conservation practice 
adoption. Factor analysis of survey data was used to identify primary risk management behaviors 
of Kansas farmers. A multinomial logit model of conservation practice adoption incorporating 
these risk behaviors was developed. Estimation results indicate that different risk management 
factors may have no significant impact on practice adoption. Farmers may not consider certain 
aspects of risk significant in their adoption decision. 
  
The third essay examines the effect of different risk management behaviors on farmers’ 
willingness to produce alternative cellulosic bioenergy feedstocks under contract. Data were 
collected using a farmer survey with a set of stated choice experiments and analyzed using factor 
analysis and latent class logistic regression models. While farmers approach risk management 
differently, the risk management behaviors identified have no significant impact on farmers’ 
willingness to produce corn stover and switchgrass but have a negative impact on farmers’ 
willingness to produce sweet sorghum as a biofuel feedstock. These results may indicate that 
farmers are indifferent toward adopting new bioenergy cropping enterprises when traditional 
crop production is profitable and more certain. 
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Chapter 1 - Purpose and Objectives 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Federal mandates requiring the use of “advanced” biofuels have been in place since 2007 
(U.S. Congress, 2007). Advanced biofuels are produced from products such as wood chips; 
agricultural residue or other waste materials; grease; other organic matter; or “sugars from 
sources other than corn starch” and have greenhouse gas emissions at least 50% below emissions 
produced from gasoline in 2005 (U.S. Congress, 2007). Lignocellulosic biofuel is biofuel with 
greenhouse gas emissions at least 60% below baseline GHG emissions (U.S. National Archives 
and Records Administration, 2010). The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) contained in the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 and administered by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) requires the volume of renewable fuel to increase from nine billion 
gallons in 2008 to 36 billion gallons annually by 2022 to help meet this goal (U.S. Congress, 
2007). In addition, beginning in 2015, the amount of renewable fuel produced from cornstarch 
should not exceed 15 billion gallons with the remainder coming from advanced biofuels in 
subsequent years (U.S. Congress, 2007). Important lignocellulosic sources of biomass for 
advanced biofuel production include agricultural residues, bioenergy crops, woody resources, 
and algae. 
Changes in production from altering cropping systems to produce biomass for biofuel 
production will impact farm management and bring about additional issues involving processing 
and transportation at the farm level. This can change the amount of GHG emissions released into 
the atmosphere (Feng, Rubin, & Babcock, 2008). Next generation biofuels, such as those 
produced from corn stover, switchgrass, forage sorghum, miscanthus, algae, yellow grease, or a 
host of other products can help meet EPA’s guidelines, particularly with respect to ethanol, and 
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can potentially reduce GHG emissions. However, farmers’ willingness to produce bioenergy 
crops depends on the enterprise’s profit potential, farmers’ risk aversion, and other economic 
costs. Well-established infrastructures (production, harvest, storage, price risk management, 
transportation, etc.) and markets exist for corn, but not for other biomass sources such as 
switchgrass or corn stover (Epplin, Clark, Roberts, & Hwang, 2007). A great deal of uncertainty 
still exists regarding biomass production, marketability, storage, and transportation. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Much research has assessed the technical feasibility of producing biofuels from 
lignocellulosic materials on agricultural land in North America (de la Torre Ugarta, English, & 
Jensen, 2007; Graham, 1994; Graham, Nelson, Sheehan, Perlack, & Wright, 2007; Heid, 1984; 
Gallagher et al., 2003; Perlack et al., 2005; Walsh, de la Torre Ugarte, Shapouri, & Slinsky, 
2003; Nelson et al., 2010). However, technical feasibility studies do not provide “necessary 
economic and institutional conditions” that a cellulosic biofuel industry requires (Rajagopal, 
Sexton, Roland-Holst, & Zilberman, 2007). While farmers’ ability to produce adequate 
quantities of biomass for bioenergy is technically feasible, their willingness to do so under 
different contractual, pricing, storage, and transportation arrangements is unknown, especially 
with respect to perennial biomass crops such as switchgrass and miscanthus. In addition, 
evaluating farmers’ risk aversion and perceptions about growing bioenergy crops requires study 
before a market develops, given the potential uncertainty and risk of adopting new crops on-
farm. 
The lack of an established market adds a great deal to the uncertainty farmers face during 
development of a nascent industry. Farmers’ decisions to grow biomass will depend on profit 
potential, machinery requirements, markets, government policy, and other subjective criteria 
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specific to each operator (Paine et al., 1996; Mapemba & Epplin, 2004). In addition, farmers’ 
willingness to adopt new technologies or practices often depends on their knowledge of the 
technology or practice and their skills at operating or implementing the practice (Pannell et al., 
2006). Farmers’ willingness to grow new crops likely depends on land tenure, demographic, risk, 
and social characteristics as well. Some research has attempted to determine how these factors 
affect farmers’ adoption characteristics with respect to biofuel crops (Anand et al., 2008; 
Bransby, 1998; Hipple & Duffy, 2002; Kelsey & Franke, 2009; Jensen et al., 2007). Farmers will 
grow bioenergy crops if the returns to the crop outweigh production costs, including opportunity 
costs (Rajagopal et al., 2007). However, the production of dedicated energy crops combined with 
decreases in traditional crop, forage, and livestock production may cause prices for these 
displaced commodities to increase in the long term and competition among dedicated energy 
crops to increase  (Dicks et al., 2009; Walsh et al., 2003). 
Well-established markets exist for most commodities farmers produce, which decreases 
uncertainty and risk (Epplin et al., 2007). Given biomass markets are not yet established, it is 
likely farmers will only grow bioenergy crops under contractual relationships that establish 
pricing, timeframe, harvest timing, storage requirements, acreage requirements, yield 
requirements, and other arrangements between farmers and biorefineries (Altman, Boessen, & 
Sanders, 2007; Epplin et al., 2007; Glassner, Hettenhaus, & Schechinger, 1998; Larson, English, 
& Lambert, 2007; Stricker, Segrest, Rockwood, & Prine, 2000; Wilhelm, Johnson, Hatfield, 
Voorhees, & Linden, 2004). A processing plant will value the product as an input, and base the 
product’s value on the eventual output (e.g., ethanol) price. Disparities between biorefineries and 
farmers’ views about the value of the biomass necessitate careful contract design. 
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Farmers may be extremely risk averse given uncertainty in the market and unfamiliarity 
with growing a new crop. Thus, understanding farmers’ risk attitudes and how it impacts their 
decisions is important. Farmers’ risk takes many forms relating to production (yield), prices 
(markets), finance, government policies, and the overall business (Dismukes, 2012). Farmers’ 
risk perceptions and attitudes towards these different areas affect their decision-making. These 
perceptions are often unobserved, yet play an important part in each person’s decision-making 
process. Determining farmers’ risk attitudes will help understand how their perceptions of risk 
and uncertainty affect their decisions whether to adopt a new enterprise or practice. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze important contract features that influence 
Kansas farmers’ willingness to grow switchgrass for bioenergy and how risk perceptions affect 
their decision-making with regard to adopting new enterprises or environmental practices. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 
Popular options for bioenergy crops in Kansas are agricultural residues such as corn 
stover, sweet or forage sorghum, and perennial crops such as switchgrass. A stated choice survey 
was administered to Kansas farmers to assess their willingness to produce these potential energy 
crops under contract. This study has three primary objectives. First, it seeks to determine 
farmers’ willingness to grow switchgrass as a bioenergy crop focusing on contract attributes that 
farmers deem important. Second, it seeks to determine how farmers’ risk perceptions affect their 
decision-making with respect to adoption decisions, focusing on conservation practice adoption. 
Third, it seeks to determine how farmers’ risk perceptions affect their decisions to adopt 
alternative cellulosic biofuel feedstocks under contract. The stated choice survey offered 
respondents alternative contract options with different prices, contract lengths, biomass 
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harvesting arrangements, insurance options, and government incentive or cost-share options to 
produce three biofuel feedstocks. 
The next sections provide brief outlines of the three essays that make up this dissertation. 
1.4 ESSAY 1 - Farmers’ Willingness to Grow Switchgrass as a Cellulosic 
Bioenergy Crop: A Stated Choice Approach 
 
 Switchgrass has been pushed as a popular biomass crop in the U.S. for production of 
liquid transportation fuels (i.e., ethanol) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and dependence on 
petroleum-based fuel products. While many research studies have assessed farmers’ technical 
feasibility of producing energy crops such as switchgrass, their willingness to do so has received 
less attention. The most likely market vehicle between farmers and biorefineries will be some 
kind of contract, but the exact form of the contract is likely to change depending on the attributes 
contained in the contract. This essay’s purpose is to assess Kansas farmers’ willingness to grow 
switchgrass as a bioenergy crop under alternative contracting scenarios using a stated choice 
survey approach. The research examines other factors affecting farmers’ decision-making such 
as farm size, sales, crops grown, and perceptions about biofuels. 
 A stated choice survey was administered to 485 Kansas farmers to assess their 
willingness to produce alternative feedstocks for biofuels. The survey asked about willingness to 
grow three types of biomass feedstocks:  corn stover, sweet sorghum, and switchgrass. After 
answering a number of questions about their farming operation, respondents were asked about 
their willingness to produce switchgrass as a cellulosic biofuel feedstock under contract. In 
addition, respondents were asked about biofuel feedstock production preferences and 
perceptions; conservation on-farm; risk management practices and perceptions; crop marketing 
practices; and demographics. 
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 An expected utility model was used to determine farm characteristics, bioenergy contract 
features, bioenergy production characteristics, and farm characteristics that influence a farmer’s 
decision to produce switchgrass for bioenergy production. A latent class logit model was used to 
determine which variables and contract attributes are important for decision makers. Results 
found that differences exist among farmers’ willingness to produce switchgrass for bioenergy 
depending on whether they are livestock producers. Results also show that farmers prefer 
contracts with higher net returns, shorter contract lengths, an option for the biorefinery to custom 
harvest, an insurance mechanism, and a cost-share program to help establish biofuel feedstock 
production. 
1.5 ESSAY 2 - Farmer Risk Perceptions and Conservation Practice Adoption 
 
 Agricultural producers’ risk perceptions are believed to play an important part in their 
decisions. Assuming farmers maximize utility when deciding whether to adopt a new crop 
enterprise, purchase machinery, or adopt a conservation practice, it can be shown that they will 
also consider risk when making these decisions. The purpose of this essay is to study farmers’ 
risk perceptions and how they influence adoption decisions, specifically conservation practice 
adoption. The objectives are to determine whether risk perceptions related to management, 
finances, or government policy affect farmers’ conservation adoption practices. 
A survey was administered by Kansas State University and the Kansas Office of the 
National Agricultural Statistics Service to assess farmers’ willingness to grow crops for biofuels, 
their risk perceptions, conservation practice adoption, and general information about their 
operations. The survey asked farmers to self-report their risk perceptions on how they manage 
financial and personal risk related to their farm operations and families. The respondent used a 
six-point Likert scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” to respond to statements 
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requesting their views on a number of personal risk-related issues. In addition, farmers were 
asked to rank themselves with respect to how their neighbors viewed their risk-taking behavior. 
Factor analysis grouped respondents by risk attitudes to determine how they view risk in 
relation to production, marketing, conservation, and adoption. Factors relating to operational 
management, insurance use, and off-farm income and investments were found to be the most 
important for the respondents. 
After estimating the risk factors, a multinomial logit regression determined how the 
respondents use conservation on their farms subject to these risk factors. Results show that their 
risk attitudes toward management style, insurance use, and off-farm income do not affect their 
decisions to adopt conservation practices significantly, indicating that certain risk perceptions 
play a small role in their decisions to adopt practices that may or may not necessarily increase 
farm profits or reduce risk. 
1.6 ESSAY 3 - Farmers’ Risk Perceptions in Stated Choice Experiments on 
Adoption of Alternative Cellulosic Biofuel Feedstocks 
 
 Much uncertainty surrounds development of a cellulosic bioenergy industry. Production 
of cellulosic and other “second-generation” biofuels continues to lag U.S. federal government 
mandates requiring increased use of these fuels. The Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS2) 
contained in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) proposed that 500 
million gallons of cellulosic biofuels be produced in 2012. However, under the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s rule-making power, they reduced the amount to 10.45 million gallons based 
on actual production capabilities (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2012). Due to this 
industry uncertainty, farmers may be reluctant to participate in new ventures to produce energy 
crops. Without established markets and prices, farmers may be reluctant to produce a product. In 
addition, farmer perceptions about biofuels and renewable energy in general will influence their 
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decisions whether to begin producing a bioenergy crop. Traditional crops and livestock have 
well-established futures and spot markets, so farmers know their production has an outlet, they 
understand production risks, and they are able to forward contract their production and hedge 
market risk. In addition, farmers have a variety of insurance products available to cover yield and 
revenue losses for both crops and livestock. 
Much research has studied consumers’ willingness to pay for products, tourism 
amenities, or improved environmental conditions by including consumers’ risk perceptions about 
food, product safety, environmental quality, etc. In a similar way, overall risk perceptions and 
perceptions about growing non-traditional crops can play an important role in determining 
whether farmers are willing to produce bioenergy crops. The purpose of this paper is to 
determine how risk and other unobserved factors affect farmers’ choices in stated choice 
experiments assessing farmers’ willingness to adopt cellulosic bioenergy feedstocks. 
A survey was administered by Kansas State University and the Kansas Office of the 
National Agricultural Statistics Service to assess farmers’ willingness to grow crops for biofuels, 
their risk perceptions, conservation practice adoption, and general information about their 
operations. In addition, farmers were asked to rate the degree to which they agree or disagree 
with certain statements designed to assess their perceptions about bioenergy crop production. 
These questions included statements about preferred biofuel crop traits, bioenergy crop 
contracting options, and farmers’ overall willingness to grow bioenergy crops. The survey asked 
farmers to self-report their risk perceptions on how they manage financial and personal risk 
related to their farm operations and families. Risk questions included statements on their habits 
with respect to purchasing medical and life insurance, maintaining a line of credit, marketing, 
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and using information to make decisions. Respondents used a six-point Likert scale where 1 = 
strongly disagree and 6 = strongly agree to respond to risk perception questions.  
A random utility model was used to determine how a farmer’s individual-specific 
characteristics and personal risk perceptions affect his/her decision without focusing only on the 
choice attributes contained in the study. A latent class model was used to determine how 
unobserved risk classes fit farmers into different categories when considering three cellulosic 
biofuel crop options in a stated choice framework. The biofuel crop options are corn stover, 
sweet sorghum, and switchgrass. Results indicate that risk perceptions do not influence farmers’ 
decisions about whether to adopt cellulosic biofuel feedstocks significantly. 
Results also indicate farmers prefer shorter contracts to longer-term contracts for annual 
bioenergy crops such as corn stover or sweet sorghum, higher returns, and a biorefinery harvest 
option regardless of the latent class they fall in. In addition, they prefer insurance, government 
incentives, and an establishment cost-share incentive to produce cellulosic bioenergy feedstocks. 
Willingness to pay estimates also vary depending on latent class membership.  
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Chapter 2 - Farmers’ Willingness to Grow Switchgrass as a 
Cellulosic Bioenergy Crop: A Stated Choice Approach 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 Federal mandates requiring the use of “advanced” biofuels have been in place for a 
number of years (U.S. Congress, 2007). Important lignocellulosic sources of advanced biomass 
include agricultural residues, bioenergy crops, woody resources, and algae. However, large-scale 
commercial production of these biomass sources is not yet viable economically, and a great deal 
of uncertainty exists about biomass production, storage, and transportation. 
 Much research has assessed the technical feasibility of producing biofuels from 
lignocellulosic materials on agricultural land in North America (de la Torre Ugarta, English, & 
Jensen, 2007; Graham, 1994; Graham, Nelson, Sheehan, Perlack, & Wright, 2007; Heid, 1984; 
Gallagher et al., 2003; Perlack et al., 2005; Walsh, de la Torre Ugarte, Shapouri, & Slinsky, 
2003; Nelson et al., 2010). However, technical feasibility studies do not assess “necessary 
economic and institutional conditions” required by a cellulosic biofuel industry (Rajagopal, 
Sexton, Roland-Holst, & Zilberman, 2007). While farmers’ ability to produce adequate 
quantities of biomass for bioenergy throughout the Great Plains has been ascertained, their 
willingness to do so under different contractual, pricing, and harvesting conditions is relatively 
unknown, especially with respect to perennial biomass crops such as switchgrass and 
miscanthus. 
Much of the previous research has assessed the viability of growing bioenergy crops from 
the perspective of land availability and farmer profitability. But an important consideration is 
that the shift from the production of traditional crops to energy crops will alter the traditional 
crop mix. Farmers will likely grow less corn, soybeans, wheat, sorghum, alfalfa, hay, cotton, or 
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rice, and more biomass crops under satisfactory prices and contractual conditions. In addition, 
land previously enrolled in conservation programs may be moved into energy-crop production to 
help meet renewable fuel requirements.  
The lack of an established market adds a great deal to the uncertainty farmers face during 
development of this nascent industry. Farmers’ willingness to adopt new technologies or 
practices often depends on their knowledge of the technology or practice and their skills at 
operating or implementing the practice (Pannell et al., 2006). However, farmers’ willingness to 
grow new crops likely depends not only on knowledge and skill, but also on land tenure, 
demographic, and social characteristics. Some research has attempted to determine how these 
factors affect farmers’ adoption characteristics with respect to biofuel crops (Anand et al., 2008; 
Bransby, 1998; Hipple & Duffy, 2002; Jensen et al., 2007; Kelsey & Franke, 2009). Farmers will 
grow bioenergy crops if the returns to the crop outweigh production costs, including opportunity 
costs (Rajagopal et al., 2007). However, the production of dedicated energy crops combined with 
decreases in traditional crop, forage, and livestock production will cause prices for these 
displaced commodities to increase in the long term, increasing competition for dedicated energy 
crops (Dicks et al., 2009; Walsh et al., 2003). 
Well-established markets exist for most commodities farmers produce, which decreases 
uncertainty and risk (Epplin, Clark, Roberts, & Hwang, 2007). But because biomass markets are 
not yet established, it is likely farmers will grow bioenergy crops under contractual relationships 
that establish pricing, timeframe, harvest parameters, storage requirements, acreage 
requirements, quality levels, and other arrangements between farmers and biorefineries (Altman, 
Boessen, & Sanders, 2007; Epplin et al., 2007; Glassner, Hettenhaus, & Schechinger, 1998; 
Larson, English, & Lambert, 2007; Stricker, Segrest, Rockwood, & Prine, 2000; Wilhelm, 
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Johnson, Hatfield, Voorhees, & Linden, 2004). Processing plants will value the product as an 
input, and base the value on the price it can receive for the output produced, while farmers’ 
decisions to grow biomass will depend on profit potential, machinery requirements, markets, 
government policy, and other subjective criteria specific to each operator (Paine et al., 1996; 
Mapemba & Epplin, 2004). The disparity between biorefineries and farmers’ views about the 
value of the biomass necessitates careful contract design. 
One of the popular options for a bioenergy crop in the Great Plains is switchgrass, 
because switchgrass planting decreases soil erosion over cultivation, uses half as much nitrogen 
fertilizer as corn, requires one herbicide application in the establishment year, and is both more 
drought and flood tolerant than traditional crops (McLaughlin & Walsh, 1998). However, 
switchgrass production is less likely to occur on highly productive land and more likely on 
marginal land or land already enrolled in conservation programs, such as CRP, to increase 
revenue (Paine et al., 1996). 
This study seeks to determine farmers’ willingness to grow switchgrass as a bioenergy 
crop while helping facilitate contract design and biomass price establishment. Few (if any) 
studies have elicited farmers’ opinions about bioenergy crops and assessed their willingness to 
produce these crops instead of traditional crops. With farm profitability at near record highs, it is 
even more important to assess whether farmers are willing to enter into bioenergy crop 
enterprises or continue with their established practices. A stated choice survey was developed to 
elicit Kansas farmers’ willingness to grow switchgrass as a bioenergy crop under alternative 
contractual, pricing, and harvesting arrangements. The stated choice format allows farmers to 
choose among alternatives following Louviere, Rose, and Greene (2005) and survey results are 
analyzed using a latent class conditional logistic regression model (Greene & Hensher, 2003). 
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The next section discusses growing switchgrass as a bioenergy crop, followed by a 
description of the survey and data. The conceptual model and econometric analysis follow the 
survey discussion. Finally, the results and conclusion end the paper. 
2.2 Switchgrass as a Bioenergy Crop 
 
 The viability of producing switchgrass as a bioenergy feedstock in the Great Plains has 
been the topic of much research (Perlack et al., 2005; Mapemba & Epplin, 2004; Epplin et al., 
2007; Bangsund, DeVuyst, & Leistritz, 2008). Switchgrass is a perennial grass, native to much 
of the Great Plains, and has been touted as a significant potential bioenergy crop based on 
research conducted across 31 locations over several years in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(Wright, 2007). It requires low maintenance after its establishment phase, is noninvasive, and is 
suited to many soil types in different parts of the country, including marginal lands not as 
productive for high-value crops such as corn or soybeans (Wright, 2007). Harvesting, 
transporting, and storing switchgrass is similar to well-established hay production practices 
(Wright, 2007), although long-term biomass storage may reduce ethanol yields (Rigdon, Maier, 
Vadlani, & Jumpponen, 2011). In addition, planting switchgrass (or other perennial crop) may 
reduce soil erosion and increases soil carbon content, improving soil health (Wright, 2007; 
McLaughlin et al., 2002). 
Production costs for switchgrass in the initial establishment phase vary depending on the 
amount of field preparation needed, fertilizer needs, and seeding rate. Establishment costs can 
range from about $150 to $200 per acre and yield during the first two years’ of production are 
reduced until the crop becomes established (Griffith, Epplin, & Redfearn, 2010). Annualized 
costs of establishing switchgrass are between $20 and $30 per acre over 10 years (Griffith et al., 
2010). Annual production costs can range from $175 to $285 per acre depending on yields of 
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two to six tons per acre, transportation, and capital costs (Griffith et al., 2010). Switchgrass is 
planted in the spring and weeds are controlled via spraying, mowing, or grazing (Ohlenbusch, 
1997). After the crop is well established, 90 to 120 pounds of nitrogen fertilizer can be applied to 
increase production, followed by phosphorus and potassium if soil testing warrants it 
(Ohlenbusch, 1997; Teel, Barnhart, & Miller, 2003). Fertilizer rates and costs will vary 
depending on soil requirements and location. 
 As a national average, switchgrass has the potential to produce 8.4 tons per acre annually 
(McLaughlin et al., 2002) with local yields reaching over 15 tons per acre depending on rainfall, 
length of growing season, soil types, etc. Yields in the plains states may not reach these levels 
due to extreme growing conditions. In addition, nitrogen use is lower and returns are higher for 
switchgrass than other types of grasses that have a potential use as a biofuel feedstock 
(Aravindhakshan, Epplin, & Taliaferro, 2011).  
McLaughlin et al. (2002) determined there is potential to produce switchgrass in the 
United States east of the Rocky Mountains on 16.9 million acres at prices of $39.92 per short ton 
at the farm gate. This price may entice farmers to plant switchgrass rather than traditional crops. 
However, high commodity prices in recent years may preclude farmers’ planting of switchgrass 
in favor of traditional cash crops. 
2.3 Survey Methods and Data 
 
A stated choice survey was administered from November 2010 to February 2011 in three 
areas of Kansas by Kansas State University and the USDA, National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS). The survey assessed farmers’ willingness to produce cellulosic biomass in the 
form of corn stover, sweet sorghum, and switchgrass for bioenergy production under different 
contractual arrangements. A total of 485 farmers were contacted in northeastern, south central, 
18 
 
and western Kansas to participate in the survey. These areas of Kansas were selected based on 
the number of farms growing corn and/or sorghum and the mix of irrigated and dryland 
production. A random sample of approximately 160 farms over 260 acres in size and $50,000 in 
gross farm sales were selected from the USDA-NASS farmer list for each area of the state 
examined. Farmers already participating in other USDA-NASS enumerated surveys (e.g., 
ARMS) were removed from the sample and replaced with another randomly drawn name. Prior 
to the survey entering the field, the stated choice component was field tested with focus groups at 
an annual extension conference hosted by the Department of Agricultural Economics at Kansas 
State University and the entire survey was tested using face-to-face interviews with farmers in 
the targeted study areas.  
Potential participants received a four-page flier via mail asking for their participation in 
the survey and providing information about cellulosic biofuel feedstock production on-farm one 
week prior to being contacted by USDA-NASS enumerators. Enumerators then scheduled one-
hour interviews with the farmers to complete the survey and stated choice experiments. 
Interviews, on average, took 57 minutes to complete. Upon completion of the survey and receipt 
at the USDA-NASS office in Topeka, farmers were compensated for their time with a $15 gift 
card. Of the 485 farmers contacted, 290 completed the survey and 38 were out-of-business, did 
not farm, or could not be located. Thus, the survey response rate was (290/(485-38)) = 0.65 or 65 
percent. Of the 290 respondents who completed the stated choice experiment for switchgrass, six 
surveys were incomplete due to lack of responses on the switchgrass experiment or refusal to 
answer demographic questions, leaving 284 usable surveys for this study. 
 After answering a number of questions about their farming operation, respondents were 
asked about their willingness to produce switchgrass as a cellulosic biofuel feedstock under 
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contract. Respondents were then asked about biofuel feedstock production preferences and 
perceptions; conservation on-farm and perceptions; risk management practices and perceptions; 
crop marketing practices; and demographics. 
 Farmer demographics taken from the 2007 U.S. Census of Agriculture (National 
Agricultural Statistics Service, 2009) were used to determine whether the survey respondents 
were representative of Kansas farmers. Table 2.1 compares some of the demographics reported 
by farmers in the survey to statewide numbers as recorded in the 2007 Census of Agriculture. 
The percentage of farmers who are white is the same for both the census and survey. A slightly 
lower average age is reasonable given our survey sampled larger farms that are likely to be 
operated by younger farmers. Average farm size and amount of rented land are considerably 
larger for our survey since we sampled farms over 260 acres in our sample, thus eliminating 
many small, or hobby farms. More of the survey respondents are male than in the Census figures. 
Average value of agricultural products found in the survey includes the value reported by Census 
figures. The survey asked respondents to choose a range in which their agricultural value of sales 
fell, and the most oft chosen range matches Census data. 
2.3.1 The Stated Choice Experiment 
 A stated choice experiment was designed to assess farmers’ willingness to produce 
switchgrass for biofuel under contract with biorefineries or other biomass processors following 
Louviere, Hensher, and Swait (2000) and Roe, Sporleder, and Belleville (2004). The survey 
provided a brief explanation of switchgrass production and explained the contract attributes, 
shown in Figure 2.1 before requiring a response to the set of stated choice questions shown in 
Figure 2.2. Survey respondents were asked to consider five independent choice scenarios with 
options to choose between two contracts or an “opt out” option, as shown in Figure 2.2. Contract 
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options were unlabelled and had five attributes:  (1) Net returns above CRP or Hay Production, 
(2) Contract Length, (3) Biorefinery Harvest Option, (4) Insurance Availability, and (5) Seed 
Cost-Share Provision. Descriptive statistics for the attributes and levels are shown in Table 2.2 
and discussed in the next section. 
 It is assumed that switchgrass will only be planted on marginal land (that may not be 
renewed in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)) or that is currently in hay production. 
Therefore, net returns above hay or CRP payments had three levels:  5%, 20%, and 35%. Using 
the percentage net returns above those earned from traditional crop production practices 
(assumed to be about $40 per acre), a market price for biomass can be determined using 
production costs and crop yields, without putting a precise monetary value on the biomass. In 
addition, using the percentage net return above hay or CRP production will allow prices to 
“float” to levels that will entice farmers to adopt switchgrass. Farmers understand returns per 
acre, so asking them to indicate a desired return per acre is useful because many farmers are 
unwilling to make a decision to grow biomass without knowing production costs and actual 
dollar returns based on prices and yields. Then, a biomass price can be determined from price 
and yield combinations that produce the farmers’ desired return per acre. Policy makers and the 
biofuel industry will benefit from the survey results because they will know whether farmers are 
willing to supply biomass, while realizing prices required for farmers to adopt. The method 
benefits biorefineries by helping them determine prices they can afford to pay for biomass by 
knowing how much farmers require to make it a worthwhile enterprise. The attribute is recoded 
from a percentage to a dollar amount for analysis purposes, using $40 as a base net return. 
Contract length has two levels:  7 years and 16 years. Since switchgrass is planted 
approximately once every ten years, a producer may wish to enter into a contract length of at 
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least seven years. If they choose to continue producing switchgrass, it is likely they would enter 
into a contract for 16 (or more) years. However, 7- and 16-year contracts allow a producer to 
discontinue switchgrass production if they chose to transition their land back into regular crop or 
hay production, or CRP. 
 To add flexibility to the contract options, an effects coded (−1, +1) biorefinery harvest 
option is included as a binary choice that offers a custom harvest option at the biorefinery’s 
expense, but does not require the farmer to allow the biorefinery on their land to harvest the 
biomass. Net returns is assumed to include the cost of biorefinery harvest. Insurance availability 
is another effects coded binary attribute that indicates whether a crop-insurance type instrument 
is available for farmers to purchase under the biomass contract. Effects coding helps capture the 
grand mean of a utility function without confusing a base level mean that can occur when 
assigning dummy codes or usual (i.e., 1,0) binary coding (Hensher, Rose, & Greene, 2005). In 
addition, assigning a zero to the value would indicate the attribute is not included in the contract. 
Finally, a seed-cost share attribute is included with three levels:  0%, 35%, and 70%. The high 
cost of establishing switchgrass may necessitate the biorefinery’s sharing in seed costs. The three 
levels indicate a percentage of the seed cost the biorefinery would pay under each contract 
scenario. 
 The choice scenarios contain two generically labeled contracts with attributed levels 
assigned randomly and an option to “opt out.” Following Louviere et al., (2000) a (32 × 23)2 
fractional factorial design was used to develop 90 random choice sets in order to identify all 
main effects and any potential interaction effects between attributes and levels. The choice sets 
were randomly assigned into 18 blocks (18 survey versions) and each respondent was presented 
with five choice scenarios (see Figure 2.2). 
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2.3.2 Summary Statistics 
 The most popular first choice among respondents was “do not adopt” with  1047 of 1420 
responses. This leaves only 373 choices, or 26.3%, where a contract (either A or B) would be 
adopted. This is expected with an enterprise such as switchgrass. A great deal of uncertainty 
surrounds switchgrass production with regard to yield, seed, production, and maintenance costs, 
and net returns. In addition, establishing the crop for ten years (or more) causes some hesitation 
due to uncertainty with regard to opportunity costs of not growing traditional crops or having a 
CRP constraint. Finally, farmers may be reluctant to enter into such long-term contractual 
arrangements. The results section includes a more in-depth discussion of this topic. It is 
interesting to note, however, that when asked, “Considering you enter into a favorable contract 
with a biorefinery, would you produce [switchgrass] on your farm?”, 69.8% responded they 
would consider growing switchgrass and initially commit an average of 101 acres to the crop.  
Table 2.2 contains a description of the attributes and levels as well as summary statistics 
for the values of the attributes presented to farmers where the first choice was to adopt a contract 
(either A or B). Contract length is somewhat shorter when the first choice was to choose a 
contract, which is expected given that farmers desire shorter contracts. Net returns and seed cost 
share have higher means for the chosen contract options than the entire sample, indicating 
farmers choose higher levels of these options when possible. The binary options, biomass harvest 
and insurance availability, have means near zero, indicating an even number of each was offered 
as an option and chosen by farmers. However, of farmers who indicated they would be willing to 
adopt, the average is 0.14, indicating the biomass harvest option has a positive influence on 
whether a farmer will adopt switchgrass. In the northeast section of the state, 113 (30.3%) 
respondents chose to adopt a contract as their first choice. In the central part of the state, 139 
23 
 
(37.3%) chose to adopt, and in the west, 121 (32.4%) chose to adopt a contract as their first 
choice. 
2.3.3 Conceptual Model and Econometric Analysis 
2.3.3.1 Theoretical Model 
 Following Roe et al. (2004), assume producers maximize expected discounted random 
utility when they choose to enter into a switchgrass contract instead of producing hay or CRP. 
Then, producer i’s expected discounted utility for contract j is: 
(2.1)                                       
where     is the net return above CRP or hay production over time, Cj is the contract length in 
years, Hj is the biomass harvest option, Ij is biomass crop insurance availability, and Sj is the 
establishment cost-share attribute. Due to variation in climate and growing conditions across 
Kansas, a fixed effects location parameter, Lki, is added to account for farmers in the northeast, 
west, or central portions of the state. Finally, the error term, εi,j, represents the nonsystematic part 
of expected utility that is unobserved by the researcher and is assumed to be distributed Type I 
extreme value (Louviere et al., 2000; Train, 2003). 
2.3.3.2 Econometric Model 
 A latent class model (LCM) is estimated because it takes account of unobserved 
characteristics of each respondent as well as latent heterogeneity in unobserved factors (Greene 
& Hensher, 2003). The LCM can relax the independent and irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption between classes, but does impose IIA within classes (Greene, 2007). Following 
Greene and Hensher (2003), a LCM that calculates the probability of respondent i from class q (q 
= 1, 2, …, Q) choosing alternative (contract) j among alternatives j = 1, 2, …, J for choice 
situation, τ (w = 1, 2, …, Τ): 
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(2.2)
                                                              
                                                                                   
         
    
          
    
 
   
  
 
where       is a matrix of choice attributes chosen by individual i and   is a vector of 
coefficients for individuals in class q. Following Greene and Hensher (2003), this can be written 
as 
(2.3)                                     
 The probability that an individual, i, will fall into a certain class, q, in choice set τ then becomes 
(2.4)               
 
    
 Latent class probabilities sum to one, so the model estimates Q – 1 latent class estimates. A 
common form to estimate the class probability is a traditional multinomial logit form: 
(2.5)      
      
    
       
    
 
   
                    
where Miq is the latent class constant probability, αi is a vector of respondent i's characteristics 
and γq is the latent class parameter estimates. Combining equations (2.4) and (2.5) provides the 
likelihood that an individual will fall into class q: 
(2.6)               
 
    
This model allows both contract attributes and respondent characteristics to determine the choice 
probabilities (Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002). 
2.3.3.3 Empirical Estimation 
This study’s primary interest is assessing direct impacts of contract attributes on farmers’ 
willingness to accept a contract. Therefore, following Roe et al. (2004), the focus becomes the 
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reduced-form representation of expected random utility. A main effects model (Greene, 2007; 
Louviere et al., 2000) for producer i and contract j is posited as: 
(2.7)                                                         
for j = A, B, or C. Contract choices A and B represent the randomly assigned, unlabeled contract 
choices for each scenario, while Option C is the “opt out” option. As seen in Figure 2.2, Option 
C does not contain any attributes, so            and                          . 
This allows the model to control for unobserved individual effects associated with “opting out.” 
Assuming farmers are profit maximizers, the signs for β1 and β5 are expected to be 
positive since higher net returns and lower-cost seed can both contribute to increased profit. 
Farmers likely prefer short-term contracts, so the sign of β2 should be negative. The sign for β3 
may be either positive or negative depending on farmers’ views about biorefinery harvest being a 
cost-saving option, or if farmers are reluctant to allow custom operators on their property and 
location. The sign for β4 is expected to be positive since farmers will likely prefer insurance 
availability as a tool to manage risk, especially on “experimental” crops. 
 While respondents ranked their contract choices, this paper only examines their first 
choice. Thus, equation (2.7) is modeled using a latent class logistic regression model in NLOGIT 
4.0. The model uses simulated maximum likelihood with Halton draws using the BFGS 
algorithm (Greene, 2007). Predicted probabilities, estimated marginal effects, and farmers’ 
willingness to pay for alternative contractual features are calculated in MS Excel. Standard errors 
for all statistics using model results are calculated using the delta method following Greene 
(2008). 
The LCM is estimated with the contract attributes and other farmer characteristics to 
determine how farmers make decisions amid unobserved classes. Independent variables (αi) in 
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the LCM are shown in Table 2.3. Crop acres is a useful independent variable because larger crop 
producers may be more willing to adopt another enterprise if they see a benefit to further 
diversification. Hay and CRP acres are useful independent variables because they indicate 
whether a farmer has familiarity with growing hay or receive CRP payments, both of which form 
the basis for the net revenue contract attribute. The percent of cash rented acres should have a 
negative sign because it is expected that farmers who rent more land on a cash basis will be 
reluctant to plant a perennial crop such as switchgrass because they may or may not rent the land 
for the duration of the crop’s life. Livestock and baler indicate whether a farmer produces 
livestock or owns a baler. Farmers with livestock may be unwilling to adopt a switchgrass 
enterprise because they will use most of their hay acres to feed livestock, and many will own a 
baler used to make the hay they feed. Age and college are included in the model to determine if 
older, younger, or more or less educated farmers are willing to adopt a switchgrass enterprise. 
Younger farmers may be more willing to try something new if they are trying to diversify their 
operations or competing for land while older farmers may be more willing to maintain the status 
quo on their operations rather than adopt something new. Finally, risk aversion is useful to 
determine if more or less risk averse farmers are willing to adopt a switchgrass enterprise in the 
face of yield and cost of production uncertainty and the lack of a cellulosic biofuel market. Using 
these variables to determine the latent classes will explain how farmers’ characteristics affect 
their willingness to adopt a switchgrass contract (Jensen et al., 2007; Kelsey & Franke, 2009; 
Colombo, Hanley, & Louviere, 2009). 
2.4 Results 
 
The latent class coefficients are shown in Table 2.4. McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 of 0.5605 
indicates data fit the model relatively well. McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 is defined as one minus the 
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ratio of the log likelihood of the full model to the log likelihood of an intercept-only model, and 
is usually reported when estimating discrete choice models (Greene, 2008). The interpretation is 
not exactly the same as for the R
2
 from ordinary least squares regression, which explains the 
variation in the dependent variable caused by the independent variables. It is usually assumed 
that being closer to 1.0 provides a better fit and the model exhibits “good” predictive power 
although it is unlikely that the Pseudo-R
2
 will ever be 1.0 and is often closer to 0.0 (Train, 2003; 
Greene, 2008). Coefficients for the contract attributes are in line with predictions, where only 
contract length has a negative effect on a farmer’s utility of adopting a switchgrass enterprise. 
Table 2.5 contains descriptive statistics of the latent classes for the independent variables. 
Farmers in latent class one have fewer crop acres, fewer hay acres, more CRP acres, and are 
slightly older, on average. Approximately 54% of the farmers in latent class one indicated they 
raise livestock and have a baler while 77% and 71%, respectively of those in latent class two 
raise livestock and have a baler. About 32% of farmers in latent class one have a college 
education while about 26% in latent class two indicated they are college educated. An equal 
number of farmers in each class indicated they are risk averse. Farmers in both classes earn about 
29% of their income from livestock. Those in latent class one earn about 76% of their income 
from crop sales and those in latent class two earn about 70% of their income from crop sales. 
2.4.1 Latent Class Descriptions 
Results show the willingness of farmers to grow switchgrass as a bioenergy feedstock 
under each latent class. Interpreting the latent classes is seldom a straightforward exercise. By 
themselves, the coefficient estimates for the latent classes have little meaning (Greene & 
Hensher, 2003). However, the classes can be interpreted based on how respondents’ 
characteristics become categorized, taking care to interpret them relative to the base category 
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(where class, or segment parameter estimates are fixed to estimate the model) and each other 
(Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002). The model was run with two, three, four, and five classes to 
determine the optimal number of classes. Using the AIC is a common method to determine the 
appropriate number of classes (Breffle, Morey, & Thacher, 2011; Colombo et al., 2009; 
Meyerhoff, Bartczak, & Liebe, 2012). Running the model with two latent classes provided the 
lowest AIC, and a more cogent interpretation of the classes. 
 As noted in Table 2.4, latent class 1 contains 70% of the respondents and is most likely 
comprised of producers unwilling to adopt a switchgrass enterprise. The negative coefficients for 
livestock use may indicate these farmers consider switchgrass would impact their livestock 
enterprise negatively. Respondents in class 1 are likely younger and have more college education 
compared to the farmers in latent class 2, although the lack of significance for the coefficients 
makes it difficult to determine this with much certainty. Farmers in class 1 have about the same 
likelihood of adopting a switchgrass contract if they are from the central or eastern part of the 
state. For these producers, increasing returns, offering a biorefinery harvest option, and offering 
to share some of the establishment costs will increase the likelihood they will adopt a 
switchgrass contract. However, increasing the contract length will decrease the likelihood of 
switchgrass adoption. 
 Latent class 2 contains about 30% of the respondents. This class likely contains farmers 
who are more willing to adopt a switchgrass enterprise. Farmers in this class from the eastern 
portion of the state are less likely to adopt a switchgrass contract while those from the central 
part of the state may or may not be willing to adopt a contract. However, for Kansas farmers, 
increasing contract length will reduce willingness to adopt a contract while increasing returns, 
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offering a biorefinery harvest option, offering insurance, and having a cost-share option will 
increase the likelihood of adoption. 
2.4.2 Marginal Willingness to Pay 
Table 2.6 indicates farmers’ marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for various contract 
attributes for some net return above hay production or CRP. MWTP is defined as βi/ βNR, 
following Hensher et al. (2005) and Greene and Hensher (2003), where βi is the latent class 
parameter for attribute i = contract length, biorefinery harvest, insurance, and seed cost-share in 
each latent class and βNR is the coefficient on Net Returns. MWTP indicates the willingness to 
pay for a marginal (i.e., one unit) change in the attribute. 
As expected, the negative sign on contract length indicates farmers require a payment to 
enter into longer-term contracts, but positive signs on the other attributes for some of the classes 
indicate they are willing to pay for these attributes. Contract length is the only attribute with 
MWTP estimates statistically significant in each class. Farmers in class 1 require $9.33 per acre 
more per year of additional contract length to enter into a contract, which is may be expected 
from non-adopters relative to adopters. Adopters in class 2 only require $0.72 per acre more per 
year of additional contract length to enter into a contract. This result may be because of non-
adopters’ relative unwillingness to adopt, so the relatively small MWTP estimate may not be a 
determining factor in their willingness to adopt.  
Adopters in class one are willing to pay $11.44 per acre for the biorefinery to harvest if 
the biorefinery provides the option. However, adopters in class two are willing to only pay $1.32 
per acre for the biorefinery harvest option. 
The insurance availability MWTP estimates are not statistically significant for adopters, 
but non-adopters are willing to pay $1.61 per acre to have the attribute included in a switchgrass 
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production contract. Finally, farmers’ MWTP for the cost share attribute is $0.15 per acre per 
one percentage increase in the percentage seed costs paid by the biorefinery ceteris paribus for 
farmers in latent class two. This indicates that non-adopters require slightly less compensation to 
enter into any contract to grow switchgrass—even if the biorefinery is not willing to share all 
crop establishment costs. 
2.5  Conclusions and Further Research 
 
 Switchgrass has great potential to help reduce the nation’s dependence on nonrenewable 
sources of energy, but much uncertainty exists as to its viability in Kansas. Kansas farmers were 
surveyed to assess their willingness to grow switchgrass as a biofuel feedstock under alternative 
contract scenarios. Results show that contract attributes positively affecting farmers’ decisions. 
These attributes include net returns, biorefinery harvest options, insurance availability, and seed 
cost-share assistance. Contract length negatively affects farmers’ decisions on which contract to 
choose, who prefer shorter-term contracts. 
A latent class model, which is a special case of a multinomial logistic regression, was run 
to predict the likelihood farmers would choose to adopt a contract to grow switchgrass for 
bioenergy over “opting out.” The model allows for coefficient estimates for each respondent to 
be aggregated with choice-specific characteristics in a stated-choice framework. Latent classes 
account for unobserved respondent heterogeneity due to farm or farmer characteristics. Two 
latent classes observed are comprised of farmers who are more or less likely to adopt 
switchgrass. Adopters are more likely to enter into a switchgrass contract than livestock 
producers and are more willing to pay more for a biorefinery harvest option, but require more 
compensation to enter into long-term contracts.  
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 WTP estimates show that contract length is an important attribute (maybe the most 
important attribute) in determining whether a farmer will produce switchgrass for bioenergy for 
each latent class. In each class, farmers require some payment ranging from $9.33 (for adopters) 
to $0.72 (for non-adopters) per acre per additional year of contract length to produce switchgrass 
for bioenergy. In addition, farmers see a seed-cost share arrangement as beneficial to entering 
into a switchgrass producing contract and non-adopters are willing to pay about $0.15 per acre 
per percentage point increase in the share of establishment costs paid by the biorefinery. 
A primary area of further research is to determine how bioenergy crop characteristics, 
storage, and transportation issues affect farmers’ decisions to grow a bioenergy crops. Risk 
aversion is also important when assessing farmers’ willingness to adopt new technology or 
practices and could affect their decisions. The latent class logit model presented here attempts to 
control for these, but it does not help explain how farmers base their decisions because of these 
characteristics specifically.  
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Table 2.1. Comparison of Kansas farmer demographics to survey respondents. 
 2007 Census of Agriculture Survey 
Percent white 98.9% 98.9% 
Age 57.7 years 55.9 years 
Percent male principal 
operators 
87.9% 95.9% 
Average size of farm 707 acres 2147 acres 
Average amount of 
rented land in farm 
863 acres 1388 acres 
Average market value of 
agricultural products 
$219,944 $200,000 to $399,999 
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Table 2.2. Attribute descriptions and summary statistics of attributes and levels for each randomly assigned contract type for the entire sample versus those who 
chose a contract as their 1st choice. 
   
   
Entire Sample 
(N = 1420) 
1st Choice to Adopt 
(N = 373) 
Attribute Attribute Description Levels Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Net Returns 
Above Hay/CRP 
(%) 
 
Represents the expected percentage gain under the contract above net 
returns associated with hay production and/or CRP rental payments on 
your operation. 
 
5% 
20% 
35% 
20.032 12.195 23.981 11.236 
Contract Length 
(years) 
 
Represents the time commitment in consecutive years of the contractual 
agreement. 
 
7Years 
16 Years 
11.231 4.493 9.775 4.162 
Biomass Harvest 
Optiona 
 
“Yes” indicates the bio-refinery will harvest the biomass at their expense, 
and “No” means the farmer is responsible for harvest (including cutting, 
raking, baling and transportation to the bio-refinery). Harvest charges are 
included in the percentage net return. That is, the charges are considered 
paid regardless of who harvests the biomass. 
 
Yes = 1 
No = -1 
0.018 1.000 0.137 0.992 
Insurance 
Availabilitya 
 
“Yes” indicates crop insurance is available, and “No” otherwise. 
 
Yes = 1 
No = -1 
-0.037 1.000 0.046 1.000 
Seed Cost Share 
(%) 
 
Indicates a percentage of seed/establishment costs are covered or cost-
shared by the biorefinery or processor due to lower yields during the 
establishment period. This will be provided every time the crop is 
replanted. This cost-share is provided in addition to the net returns 
indicated above. 
0% 
35% 
70% 
33.829 28.541 40.161 27.574 
a These binary attributes were effects coded.  
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Table 2.3. Summary statistics for variables included in latent class probabilities. (N = 284) 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum Description 
Crop acres 1,556 1,398 8620 0 
Number of acres used to 
produce crops. 
Hay acres 72 100 500 0 
Number of acres used to 
produce hay. 
CRP acres 34 106 1,200 0 
Number of acres enrolled in 
Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP). 
Percent Cash Rent 32% 39% 100% 0% 
Percent of rented acres 
rented on a cash basis. 
Livestock
a 
61%    
Percent indicating they have 
livestock 
Use a baler
a 
59%    
Percent indicating they use a 
baler 
Age 56 12 85 24  
College
a 
30%    
Percent indicating they have 
a college education 
Risk Averse
a 
89%    
Percent indicating they are 
at least somewhat risk 
averse. 
a
Binary variables. 
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Table 2.4. Coefficient estimates for the each latent class utility model. 
Coefficients’ signs indicate increased or decreased likelihood of adoption 
given contract attributes. 
 
LC 1 
Non-adopters 
LC 2 
Adopters 
Central 
0.6589* 
(0.3718) 
0.1895 
(0.1823) 
East 
-0.8711* 
(0.5279) 
-1.2858*** 
(0.1757) 
Returns 
0.0687** 
(0.0346) 
0.1599*** 
(0.0122) 
Contract Length 
-0.6409*** 
(0.0761) 
-0.1147*** 
(0.0113) 
Harvest 
0.7859*** 
(0.2149) 
0.2113*** 
(0.0612) 
Insurance 
-0.0724 
(0.1703) 
0.2580*** 
(0.0627) 
Cost-Share 
0.0149** 
(0.0061) 
0.0234*** 
(0.0022) 
------------------------------------Latent class segments----------------------------
-------- 
Constant 
2.3277*** 
(0.5249) 
----- 
Crop Acres 
-0.0874 
(0.1207) 
----- 
Hay Acres 
-0.0216 
(1.455) 
----- 
CRP Acres 
0.0323 
(1.6722) 
----- 
Per. Cash Rent 
-1.3039*** 
(0.4706) 
----- 
Livestock 
-1.1953*** 
(0.3507) 
----- 
Baler 
-0.0048 
(0.0078) 
----- 
Age 
-0.0024 
(0.0033) 
----- 
College 
0.4198 
(0.3407) 
----- 
Risk Averse 
0.5148 
(0.3183) 
----- 
Percent in each class 69.9% 30.1% 
Model Fit Statistics 
Number of respondents 
 
284  
 
Number of observations 
 
1420 
 
Restricted Log-Likelihood 
 
-1560.03 
 
AIC 
 
0.99946 
 
McFadden Pseudo R
2
 
 
0.5605 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at α = 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, 
respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 2.5. Descriptive statistics by latent class.† 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Max 
 
Min 
 
Median 
 
LC1
c 
LC2 
 
LC1 LC2 
 
LC1 LC2 
 
LC1 LC2 
 
LC1 LC2 
Crop Acres 1567 1642 
 
1400 1395 
 
8620 7463 
 
70 186 
 
1100 1200 
Hay Acres 115 125 
 
103 110 
 
500 500 
 
0 0 
 
80 90 
CRP Acres 138 90 
 
194 127 
 
1200 648 
 
3 0 
 
75 52.5 
Per. Cash Rent
a 
39.0 40.4 
 
40.8 36.5 
 
100 100 
 
0 0 
 
23 29 
Livestock
b
 54.2% 77.1% 
            
 
45.8% 22.9% 
            Baler
b
 54.2% 71.1% 
            
 
45.8% 28.9% 
            Age 57 54 
 
12 11 
 
85 85 
 
24 29 
 
56 52 
College
b
 31.8% 26.5% 
            
 
68.2% 73.5% 
            Risk Averse
b
 89.1% 90.4% 
            
 
10.9% 9.6% 
            Per. Crop Sales
a 
76.3 70.3 
 
21.4 21.7 
 
100 97 
 
0 21 
 
85 75 
Per. Livestock Sales
a 
29.3 29.2 
 
19.1 20.1 
 
100 73 
 
0 0 
 
25 27 
a
Values are percentages.
 
b
Binary variables. Values are percentage of respondents with and without livestock, percentage with and without a baler, percentage with and without a 
college education, and percentage indicating they are risk averse in each class. 
c
Latent class 1 includes non-adopters while latent class 2 is made up of adopters of a switchgrass enterprise. 
†Summary statistics are calculated based on highest probability that a respondent falls in latent class 1 or 2. 
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Table 2.6. Willingness to pay estimates for returns versus other 
contract attributes in dollars per acre. 
Attribute 
LC 1 
Non-adopters 
LC2 
Adopters 
 
Contract length 
-9.33*** 
(4.087) 
-0.72*** 
(0.061) 
 
Biorefinery harvest 
11.44* 
(6.246) 
1.32*** 
(0.376) 
 
Insurance 
-1.05 
(2.593) 
1.61*** 
(0.387) 
 
Seed cost share 
0.22 
(0.139) 
0.15*** 
(0.014) 
 
Standard errors are calculated via the delta method and are included in parentheses. 
 *** and * indicate statistical significance at α = 0.01 and 0.10, respectively. 
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Figure 2.1. Explanation of switchgrass production practices, costs, and contract attribute 
descriptions. 
 
  
SECTION 2A                        PERENNIAL BIOENERGY CROP OPTION: SWITCHGRASS 
 
This section will ask about your willingness to supply switchgrass, a perennial bioenergy crop, to a biorefinery or 
intermediate processor (e.g. cooperative) through different contractual agreements. You will be asked to consider 5 
scenarios. Each scenario contains three options:  two contract options and one for “do not adopt.” The final option 
provides the option to “opt out” if the contracts presented are not favorable to you. Each contract will have different 
features, which include net returns per acre, contract length, a harvest option, an insurance availability option, and a cost-
share provision option.  
 
Switchgrass is a perennial crop that can be grown in place of other annual crops, on hay land, or less productive lands 
(e.g. CRP land). Harvesting of switchgrass involves cutting, raking and then baling the stalks. Switchgrass has a two-year 
establishment period with no harvest in the first year, a reduced yield in year two, finally reaching full yield potential in 
year three. Replanting occurs about every 10 years. Expected biomass yields for switchgrass range from 1 to 8 dry tons 
per acre, but yields will vary depending on climatic conditions and geography. In the future, biomass yields are expected 
to increase with improvements in plant breeding and harvest technology. Biomass harvesting can be done by the farmer 
(with his/her own equipment or by hiring a custom operator) or by the biorefinery. Harvesting would take place in the late 
fall or could occur during the winter. The annual average cost of production for a switchgrass enterprise ranges from $44 
to $142 per acre. In the following scenarios, the biorefinery will be responsible for long-term storage of biomass; a 
minimum acreage contract will be negotiated between the bio-refinery and farmer; and the contract will include an “Act of 
God” clause. 
 
Each scenario presented will present different contractual options with the following features: 
 
Contract Feature Description 
Net Returns 
 
(for all features of the 
contract except the 
seed/establishment costs) 
Represents the expected percentage gain under the contract above net returns associated 
with hay production and/or CRP rental payments on your operation. As a reference point, on 
average, returns from hay production or income from land in CRP are expected to be around 
$40 per acre in Kansas.  
 
For example, if your CRP rental rate is $40/acre, a 10% return above $40 per acre will be 
$44/acre. This amount is received after all expenses, including harvest and insurance are 
paid, but does not include the seed/establishment cost-share payment. 
Contract Length Represents the time commitment in consecutive years of the contractual agreement. 
Biorefinery Harvest 
“Yes” indicates the bio-refinery will harvest the biomass at their expense, and “No” means 
the farmer is responsible for harvest (including cutting, raking, baling and transportation to 
the bio-refinery). Harvest charges are included in the percentage net return. That is, the 
charges are considered paid regardless of who harvests the biomass. 
Insurance Availability “Yes” indicates crop insurance is available, and “No” otherwise.  
Seed/Establishment 
Cost-Share 
Indicates a percentage of seed/establishment costs are covered or cost-shared by the 
biorefinery or processor during the first two years of production or after planting due to 
lower yields during the establishment period. Establishment costs can range from $150 to 
$200 per acre. This will be provided every time the crop is replanted. This cost-share is 
provided in addition to the net returns indicated above.  
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Figure 2.2. Example of stated choice question for a switchgrass choice scenario. 
 
 
Switchgrass Scenarios   –   For each scenario evaluate the contractual options and please rank the contract options in the  
order that you would prefer them with 1 = first choice, 2 = second choice, and 3 = third choice.    
  
CONSISDER EACH SCENARIO INDEPENDENTLY .   
  
  
Scenario 1:   
  
  Contract t A   Contract B   Option C   
Contract Features 
  
Net Return Above Hay  
Production/CRP Rental  
Rates    
(Base: $40/ac)   
35 % Higher/year   5 % Higher/year   
Do Not Adopt   
Contract Length   16   Years   7   Years   
Biorefinery Harvest   Yes   No   
Insurance Available   No   Y e s   
Seed/ Establishment   
Cost - Share   
35%   7 0 %   
  Your Ranking   
(1 - 3)   
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Chapter 3 - Farmer Risk Perceptions and Conservation Practice 
Adoption 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 Conservation programs in the U.S. have been popular for a number of years to protect 
soil and water resources. Initially, farmers were encouraged to employ conservations methods 
that would reduce soil erosion such as planting of tree rows, seeding grass in areas of severe 
runoff, and using conservation tillage. The U.S. government has subsidized farmers for using 
conservation practices under a variety of conservation programs (Natural Resources 
Conservation Service, 2012). While conservation is not necessarily a risk reducing practice, 
studying farmers’ risk perceptions and the effects on conservation practice adoption is important 
to determine the type(s) of farms that practice conservation. 
Assuming farmers maximize utility when deciding whether to adopt a new crop 
enterprise, purchase machinery, or adopt a conservation practice, economic theory suggests 
farmers will consider risk when making these decisions. Recent research has studied how 
farmers’ risk perceptions affect their willingness and timing of adopting new technology and 
practices (i.e., organic farming, conservation, insurance products, etc.) (Greiner, Patterson, & 
Miller, 2009; Läpple & Van Rensburg, 2011; Mitchell, 2004), and how risk attitudes affect the 
management of their operation overall (Bard & Barry, 2000; Bard & Barry, 2001). 
The purpose of this study is to analyze how risk perceptions about management, finances 
or insurance, marketing strategies, and government policy influence farmers’ conservation 
practice adoption. A survey administered to Kansas farmers elicited their risk perceptions in a 
Likert-scale framework and asked them to indicate conservation practices they use. Factor 
analysis grouped the risk perception questions into management, insurance use, and off-farm 
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income categories. A multinomial logit model is then used to assess how these risk perception 
categories, farmers’ views about the importance of conservation, and farm characteristics 
influence farmers’ decision-making with respect to conservation practice adoption. 
The next section contains a brief literature review, followed by a discussion about the 
survey data, conceptual model, and empirical methods. Finally, a discussion of results and 
implications for further research conclude the paper. 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
 Two areas of research studied extensively are farm-level conservation adoption and risk. 
Often, risk is included in analyzing farmers’ willingness to adopt conservation from a technology 
perspective, where risk is modeled as financial risk associated with the investment or return on 
adoption. Conservation adoption is modeled in terms of the returns to adopting the practice for 
the farmer or the analysis determines the effectiveness of government programs designed to 
encourage conservation adoption. Furthermore, many factors such as farm size, amount of rented 
land, crops grown, livestock produced, or labor availability go into farmers’ decisions about 
conservation practice adoption. 
  Soule, Tegene, and Wiebe (2000) analyzed the effect of land tenure on conservation 
tillage adoption, and found owner-operators and share-renters are more likely to adopt 
conservation practices than cash-renters. This is due, in part, to their willingness to bear risk. 
They modeled farmers’ decisions to adopt conservation if it maximized the present value of land. 
To value land, they multiplied the terminal value of land by a land tenure indicator variable and 
added it to the farmer’s share of revenue and costs from adopting conservation. Assuming that 
share-renters are more risk averse than cash renters, it is possible that share-renters adopt 
conservation practices because returns under risk or uncertainty are higher for adopting 
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conservation. This may occur because property owners share some of the cost of conservation 
adoption. However, with respect to highly erodible land (HEL), owner-operators were least 
likely to adopt conservation tillage except to the degree necessary to qualify for government 
program payments. Featherstone and Goodwin (1993) also found that farms with rented land 
were less likely to invest in conservation practices. 
 Larger farms are more likely to adopt conservation practices (Featherstone & Goodwin, 
1993; Soule et al., 2000; D'Emden, Llewellyn, & Burton, 2008; Davey & Furtan, 2008). This 
may be due to their ability to spread the cost of adoption across more acres. Corporate farms are 
more likely to invest in conservation practices, possibly due to their ability to reduce personal 
liability and take advantage of tax incentives associated with the corporate structure 
(Featherstone & Goodwin, 1993; Davey & Furtan, 2008). Operator age negatively influences a 
farmer’s probability of adopting conservation practices (Featherstone & Goodwin, 1993; Soule et 
al., 2000). However, family size and quantity of labor positively influence conservation adoption 
(Featherstone & Goodwin, 1993; Davey & Furtan, 2008) due to larger families’ ability to spread  
labor across multiple duties and people, and because they may wish to pass on the farm to the 
next generation. 
 While the studies above focused on returns as motivating conservation adoption, some 
farmers may adopt because of environmental consciousness or concern for their neighbors. 
Sheeder and Lynne (2011) determined that as farm income increases, farmers are more likely to 
adopt no-till, but that selfishness and maintaining farm quality also increase the likelihood of 
adoption. However, farmers are less likely to adopt no-till if control of their farm is threatened. 
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1
Greiner et al. (2009) conducted a survey to determine how social and economic 
characteristics of farmers in the Burdekin River Catchment Area of Northeastern Australia 
affected their decisions to adopt best management practices (BMPs). Included in their survey 
were questions categorizing farmers based on risk perceptions and risk management practices. 
They used principal components analysis to group farmers by risk management practices and 
found that farmers who considered themselves risk takers with respect to new grazing adoption 
more often adopted BMPs such as rotational grazing, changing pasture stocking rates, and 
removing cattle early when faced with drought conditions. They determined farmers 
implemented conservation measures to comply with government regulations and farmers with 
high economic or financial motivation were more attuned to risk. Finally, they determined 
farmers consider themselves risk averse based on emotions, but actual sources of risk such as 
price, yield, financial, or personal risk lead farmers to evaluate risk using rational thinking. 
Ultimately, farmers consider personal values and lifestyle motivations when assessing their risk 
attitudes, risk management strategies, and conservation practices. However, as economic status 
increases, conservation practice adoption decreases. 
 Maybery, Crase, and Gullifer (2005) used factor analysis to find relationships among 
farmers’ economic, lifestyle, and conservation attitudes. They found that economic and lifestyle 
values have a strong relationship relative to conservation values. They also found that economic 
policies may be necessary to induce farmers to adopt conservation practices if farmers have 
strong economic (i.e., financial) goals. 
                                                 
1
 Two types of data-reducing methods are used in the following discussion:  principal components and factor 
analysis. Principal components analysis does a linear transformation on a correlated set of variables and transforms 
them into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables while maintaining most of the information in the original data 
(Dunteman, 1989). Factor analysis assumes observed variables are linear combinations of some unobserved 
“factors” and is useful to reduce the number of observed variables to a smaller set of hypothetical variables (Kim & 
Mueller, 1978). 
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 In a study about organic farming adoption, Läpple and Van Rensburg (2011) found off-
farm income did not affect adoption and that larger farms are less likely to adopt practices such 
as organic farming or other labor-intensive practices. They also found that a high profit motive 
negatively affected the likelihood of early adoption, but heightened environmental concern 
positively affected early adoption. Information about organic farming and personally knowing 
organic farmers is also an important consideration for early adopters’ adoption patterns. Finally, 
they found that late adopters tend to be less risk averse, but there is not a significant relationship 
with early adopters and risk aversion. 
 Flaten, Lien, Koesling, Valle, and Ebbesvik (2005) found that farmers who were willing 
to adopt organic dairy farming practices in Norway thought of themselves as less risk averse than 
conventional farmers. In addition, using financial tools (i.e., hedging), insurance, and disease 
prevention were the most important risk management strategies. Both organic and conventional 
producers desire stable governmental agricultural policy. 
 Akcaoz and Ozkan (2005) used factor analysis to relate risk averse, risk neutral, and risk 
seeking farmers’ attitudes toward risk in the Cukurova region in Turkey. For each group, they 
found eight risk factors relating to the environment, prices (market risk), catastrophes (i.e., 
floods, fire, and landslides), input costs, production and technology risk, political uncertainty, 
financing risk, and family relationships (including family labor). Risk averse farmers were most 
concerned about changes in government policy, output costs variability, the overall economy, 
crop prices, crop yields, and their debt load. Risk seeking farmers were most concerned with 
changes in input costs and crop prices and least concerned about health problems. Risk neutral 
farmers were most concerned with input costs and least concerned with family relationships. 
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Risk averse and risk seeking farmers used crop rotations as a risk management strategy but risk 
neutral farmers were more likely to spread sales to reduce risk exposure. 
 This paper will contribute to the previous literature by using factor analysis to group 
farmers’ responses to risk perception questions and determine how these risk perceptions affect 
conservation practice adoption using a random utility model.  
3.3 Data and Methods 
 
 This section explains the data, reviews the theoretical utility framework for farmers 
maximizing utility, and then discusses the empirical model that is useful to analyze farmers’ 
conservation adoption subject to risk perceptions.  
3.3.1 Data 
A stated preference survey was administered from November 2010 to January 2011 to 
485 farmers with more than 260 crop acres and at least $50,000 in gross sales throughout 
Kansas. The USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), Kansas Field Office 
administered the survey using field enumerators. The survey was tested on focus groups in 
August 2010, then with face-to-face interviews in October 2010. Finally, NASS enumerators 
were trained during a two-day session and began interviewing farmers in early November. 
Interviews took 57 minutes (on average) to complete and farmers were compensated for their 
time with a $15 gift card. 290 surveys were completed and returned while 38 farmers were out of 
business or could not be reached, resulting in a 65% response rate (290/(485-38) = 0.65).  
Kansas farmers were asked to self-report perceptions on how they manage financial and 
personal risk related to their operations and families. Appendix A3 contains the list of risk-
related questions presented to each farmer. The questions were asked on a six-point Likert scale 
from “(1) strongly disagree” to “(6) strongly agree” with statements requesting their views on a 
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number of personal risk-related issues. In addition, farmers were asked to answer questions 
regarding how they thought others viewed their aversion to or preference for risk, whether they 
used crop/hail insurance, whether they kept an open credit line, and how they categorized their 
debt-to-asset ratio. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 report summary statistics for the risk-related 
questions. 
As reported in Table 3.1, 89% of farmers indicate their neighbors see them as at least 
somewhat risk averse to risk averse (questions 1 to 3), about 5% are risk neutral, and about 6% 
would be considered risk takers. Table 3.2 reports summary statistics of the remaining risk-
related questions. About 94% of the farmers indicated they use crop insurance, but just over half 
(54%) purchase hail insurance. About 85% indicated they maintain an open line credit with their 
lender. The Likert-scale questions garnered at least some agreement on most issues with average 
responses over 4.0 (somewhat agree). In general, farmers have adequate current assets to pay 
liabilities; use sound marketing practices; have adequate insurance to cover threats to health, life, 
and their operation’s liability; have well-kept machinery; try to maintain a low debt-to-asset 
ratio; have adequate backup management; try to reduce yield risk by spreading crops across a 
larger geographic area; try to be low-cost producers; and incorporate finances into their decision 
making. 
Only three questions have a somewhat disagree to disagree answer, on average. 
Respondents indicated they “somewhat disagree” and “disagree” with Questions 10 (Off-farm 
income is important for the survival of my family) and 11 (Off-farm investments are important 
sources of income for my family), respectively, with average responses of 3.53 and 2.81. These 
questions concern off-farm income and investments as being important for family survival. The 
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other question farmers somewhat disagree with is that they are prone to making last minute 
decisions with an average of 3.38. 
Table 3.3 reports the summary statistics for independent variables not related to risk or 
conservation practices. On average, farmers in the survey data set farm about 1536 acres and 
have 36 acres of CRP. Approximately one-third of the land these farmers farm is rented on a 
cash basis. About 59% of the farmers in the data set produce livestock including cattle, hogs, or 
sheep. About 38% of the farmers in the survey are from Central Kansas and 26% from Eastern 
Kansas, leaving about 36% from Western Kansas. 
The conservation practice questions in the survey asked farmers their perceptions on 
conservation as well as which conservation practices they use. Appendix B3 contains the list of 
conservation practice questions presented to each farmer and Table 3.4 contains summary 
statistics for these questions. Most farmers in the survey (81.9%) have a conservation plan for 
their farm. The conservation practice section of the survey used a Likert scale from “(1)-strongly 
disagree” to “(6)-strongly agree” asking farmers if (a) they consider themselves to be first 
adopters, (b) the importance of conservation on their farm, and (c) the importance of profit 
maximization versus environmental stewardship on their farms. The average response of the first 
question, 4.09, indicates farmers somewhat consider themselves to be first adopters, with the 
most often reported value being 4 – “somewhat agree”. This is important because it can 
determine farmers’ willingness to adopt new conservation practices. The second assesses 
farmers’ views on the importance of conservation. Farmers agree that soil and water 
conservation is important on their farms with an average response of 5.30. The third question 
assesses whether farmers place more importance on farm profits than maintaining the 
environment. With an average response of 3.13, it appears that farmers are neutral on this 
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question and may weigh profits and environmental stewardship equally. “Conservation tillage” 
included any type of conservation tillage including no-till, reduced till, strip till, and ridge till. 
Nearly all farmers (95.4%) indicate they use some type of conservation tillage. Of the 290 farms 
in the data set, 221 (76.2%) indicated they practice no-till on at least some of their crops. Only 
9.8% of farmers used cover crops. However, 22.8% use variable rate technology, which is 
technology that helps avoid over- or under-applying fertilizer and chemicals by applying the 
correct amount for a specific area of the field based on soil-testing results. Table 3.4 shows that 
21.8% of farmers plant filter/buffer strips, which are grassy areas planted to reduce runoff into 
waterways. Finally, statistics show that nearly half (48.1%) of the farmers use manure on their 
farms. Farmers were asked to indicate how often they have their soils tested. On average, they 
have their soil tested every two to three years.  
Many combinations or “bundles” of conservation practice adoption result from farmers’ 
choices in the survey. Table 3.5 shows frequencies of adoption for the potential conservation 
practice bundles available from the list of conservation practices found in Appendix B3. The 
most often reported conservation practice bundle was no-till, followed by no-till with manure 
use. Twenty-two farmers indicated they do not use any of the conservation practices listed, so are 
considered non-adopters. Only 28 farmers indicated they use cover crops but cover crops were 
never chosen alone. Since the practice was always chosen in combination with at least one other 
practice, it is bundled with other practices to be included in the estimation. 
3.3.2 Methods 
3.3.2.1 Theoretical Framework 
 Much risk preference research has used an expected utility framework to analyze risk 
preferences with respect to some kind of wealth measure. This paper does not attempt to assess 
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risk attitudes with regard to actual wealth; rather it attempts to assess how farmers may view 
certain types of potentially risky situations and how these situations affect farmers’ decisions 
about conservation practice adoption. Random utility models are usually used in stated 
preference studies and are also useful in adoption studies.  
 An expected utility framework is useful to analyze whether a farmer maximizes utility, 
U(x), using a certainty equivalent approach. Pennings and Garcia (2001) modeled intrinsic risk 
attitudes elicited from a set of rating questions using an expected utility framework with negative 
exponential and power utility functions. These functions allow study of the traditional Pratt-
Arrow risk aversion coefficient, −U’’(x)/U’(x). However, to model intrinsic risk attitudes, 
Pennings and Garcia use indirect utility as derived from a preference function, V(x), and utility 
U(x) so that U(x) = f(V(x)). Then the “Pratt-Arrow” risk aversion coefficient is 
−U’’(V(x))/U’(V(x)). This approach indicates it is possible to use rating-type questions and an 
expected utility framework to assess risk aversion. They incorporated certainty equivalence, a 
rating method, an intrinsic risk attitude, and a Likert-scale method to assess similarities in 
methods of determining risk aversion among farmers. These four measures are grouped into a 
global risk attitude construct (GRAC) that better assesses farmers’ risk aversion than a single 
measure. Correlations among the methods are used to determine that the methods produce 
similar results when assessing farmers’ risk attitudes. 
Random utility maximization (RUM) models are well suited to analyze people’s 
decision-making when considering choices people make regarding purchasing products or 
adopting new technology. RUM models are often used within a stated choice framework to 
determine preferences for choices among products or services (Train, 2003). Random utility 
assumes decision makers act by choosing alternatives that maximize utility, is derived from 
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ordinal utility, and requires repetition among choices (Batley, 2008). Using RUM models to 
determine risk attitudes is not common. Risk is usually conceptualized using expected utility 
models that require ordinal utility measures such as:  if x is preferred to y, then U(x) ≥ U(y) 
(Batley, 2008). However, random utility models can provide results similar to expected utility 
models and can provide the same interpretation if utility, U, is defined as: 
 (3.1)                      
 
where     is the systematic random utility of farmer   for conservation practice bundle       
       ;    is a set of farmer characteristics, conservation practice adoption, and risk 
perceptions; and    is a random error distributed Type I extreme value. Since the random utility 
component of expected utility in  (3.1) will maximize expected utility, maximizing random 
utility will provide the same result as maximizing expected utility. Random utility for farmer i 
adopting conservation practice bundle, j, is    , and can be modeled as: 
(3.2)                  
 
    
where farmer i chooses conservation practice bundle,              ,    is the set of farmer 
characteristics, and β is the coefficient on each   . 
Then, expected utility can be defined as: 
(3.3)                    
 
    
 
Farmer i will choose the bundle of practices,              , that maximizes expected utility, 
    , by maximizing random utility, such that they: 
(3.4)                         . 
In other words, a random utility model can be used to approximate a decision maker’s decision 
to adopt, the same as in an expected utility framework. 
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3.3.2.2 Empirical Estimation 
Factor analysis is used to condense the risk perception factors from the survey. Factor 
analysis is a useful tool for grouping respondents by risk attitudes because it reduces data 
dimensionality (Khattree & Naik, 2000). Some studies have used factor analysis (at least in part) 
to determine how farmers view risk in relation to production, marketing, conservation, and 
technology adoption (Greiner et al., 2009; Maybery et al., 2005; Flaten et al., 2005; Bard & 
Barry, 2001; Bard & Barry, 2000; Akcaoz & Ozkan, 2005). Risk in agriculture is often broken 
into production, marketing, and financial categories (Bard & Barry, 2000). Other categories of 
risk include price risks (input and output), personal risks (i.e., death, health, or family 
relationships), and institutional risks (i.e., government policy) (Meuwissen, Hardaker, Huirne, & 
Dijkhuizen, 2001). 
A basic factor analysis model can create common factors that determine a relationship 
among a set of observations and reduce data to a manageable level. A basic factor model 
following Khattree and Naik (2000) is: 
(3.5)              
where z is a p × 1 vector of observations, or risk perceptions, f is a k × 1 vector with elements f1, 
…, fk which are common factors; L is a p × k matrix of unknown constants, or factor loadings; 
and ε is a vector of elements ε1, …, εp known as specific factors. Assume that f and ε are 
uncorrelated. Then, a given    is considered a linear combination of factor elements, f1, …, fk and 
a specific factor,    as: 
(3.6)                                
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where     is the      
   element of L and becomes the factor loading, or coefficient, of    on the 
    common factor   . Then,  
   is multiplied by the z vector of individual i's risk perception 
responses to arrive at a p × 1 vector of risk factors, λ.  
Following the utility framework from Davey and Furtan (2008), utility     from using a 
conservation practice or combination of conservation practices is 
(3.7)                                   
where    is a set of farmer i’s operational and personal characteristics;    is farmer i’s risk 
perception; βj, and γj are parameter vectors; and εij is an error term for farmer i choosing 
conservation practice j and is distributed Type I extreme value. 
A multinomial regression can be used to assess farmers’ adoption of conservation 
practice bundles. Multinomial logit models use responses individuals make when presented with 
multiple choices to determine the probability a decision maker will choose one or more of J + 1 
choices (Greene, 2008). The multinomial logit model was estimated following Greene (2008), so 
the probability, P, of farmer i with farm characteristics    choosing conservation practice bundle 
j will be 
(3.8)     
                    
   
   
      
    
   
 
where                is a parameter estimate; and       since probabilities must sum to 1. 
The vector of farm characteristics includes crop and CRP acres, percent of land rented, location, 
conservation perceptions, and risk perceptions. 
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 The management risk factor was expected to influence adoption positively because 
farmers who manage potential operational risks will adopt conservation if it has some potential 
of reducing erosion or limiting other environmental damage that may shorten land productivity. 
The insurance and off-farm income risk factors’ signs were not known. The sign of crop acres 
was unknown because higher crop acreage is not necessarily a reason to adopt conservation, but 
it may not necessarily preclude a farmer from adopting conservation practices. CRP acres were 
expected to influence adoption positively because these farmers may be more conservation-
minded. A higher percentage of cash-rented land should decrease adoption (Soule et al., 2000), 
so the sign was expected to be negative. Livestock was expected to have a positive sign for the 
conservation practice bundles involving manure use. The signs for a farmer’s self-consideration 
of being a first adopter, placing a priority on conservation, or valuing the environment over 
profit were expected to be positive because adopting conservation is more likely for first 
adopters, placing conservation as a top priority on their operations, or putting more importance 
on environmental stewardship than profits. Because rainfall increases from west to east across 
Kansas, it may become less likely that farmers will adopt conservation, especially no-till, in 
Eastern Kansas as contrasted against Western Kansas. Finally, increasing soil-testing frequency 
was expected to increase the likelihood of adopting conservation practices. 
Conservation practice bundles and the frequency with which farmers choose them are 
listed in Table 3.5. Thirty-two different conservation practice bundles are available from the 
choices in the survey. However, farmers only use 15 and only eight are modeled in the 
multinomial logit regression. For some bundles, the number of regressors in the regression 
exceeds the number of respondents, which does not leave enough degrees of freedom to estimate 
the coefficients for that bundle reliably. Therefore, these observations are dropped from the 
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estimation. If a combination bundle is used less than 15 times, it is dropped from the estimation 
because it is unlikely to have a significant effect on the outcome and may cause spurious results 
(Bergtold & Molnar, 2010). The conservation practice bundles:  Variable Rate Technology (V); 
Filter/Buffer Strips (F); Variable Rate Technology and Filter/Buffer Strips (VF); Variable Rate 
Technology and Manure (VM); Filter/Buffer Strips and Manure (FM); No-till, Variable Rate 
Technology, and Filter/Buffer Strips (NVF); and No-till, Variable Rate Technology, Filter/Buffer 
Strips, and Manure (NVFM) are removed from the estimation for these reasons. 
3.4 Results 
 
 On average, about 94% of respondents indicated they are risk averse to risk neutral, as 
indicated in Table 3.1. Only 6.1% indicated they enjoy taking risks or consider themselves to be 
risk seeking. These results differ somewhat from other studies’ results on similar questions 
indicating farmers are somewhat more risk seeking (Fausti & Gillepie, 2006; Pennings & Garcia, 
2001; Akcaoz & Ozkan, 2005; Greiner et al., 2009), but concur with some research indicating 
famers are more risk averse to risk neutral (Flaten et al., 2005; Meuwissen, Huirne, & Hardaker, 
2001). 
3.4.1 Risk factors from factor analysis 
Choosing eigenvalues greater than or equal to 1.0 is the most common method for 
determining the correct number of factors. Eigenvalues explain the amount of variance in the 
factors (Hayton, Allen, & Scarpello, 2004; Costello & Osborne, 2005; Khattree & Naik, 2000; 
Kaiser, 1960). Under this method, as long as the eigenvalues are greater than one, the factor 
explains a sufficient amount of the variance in factors to warrant its inclusion in the analysis. 
However, it is also important that the researcher be able to explain the factors and that the factors 
are reliable (Kaiser, 1960). Choosing reliable factors is left to the researcher’s discretion to some 
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degree. If the factors make intuitive sense in helping answer the research question but the 
eigenvalue is slightly less than 1.0, it may make sense to include them to draw conclusions 
(Kaiser, 1960). Jolliffe (1972) found that 0.70 might be a “good” cutoff if the factor makes sense 
and can explain variation in the data adequately. 
Factor analysis separated the risk perception questions into four categories, or factors, as 
shown in Table 3.6. The first factor contains risk perceptions associated with management 
including production, technology, and marketing activities. Factor 2 includes using personal 
insurance as a risk response (financial risk). The third factor included in the analysis is off-farm 
income/investments as important for family survival. Factor 4 is included in Table 3.6 for 
completeness, but since it explains little of the variation in the data with an eigenvalue of only 
0.66, it is not considered a significant factor and is not included in further analysis. 
Eigenvalues for the first three factors are greater than or equal to one and explain 87% of 
the variance in the data. Larger correlations (in absolute value) determine where each risk 
statement should be grouped within the factors. If farmers are concerned about production, 
marketing, and financial risk, the factors should group questions related to each different type of 
risk (Bard & Barry, 2000). Meuwissen, et al. (2001) found factors relating to farm family health, 
farm finances, legislation, production, and changes in farming situation to be significant sources 
of risk. Akcaoz and Ozkan (2005) found similar results with respect to these risk factors. The 
fourth factor has an eigenvalue of only 0.66, and does not explain much of the variance in the 
data. In addition, the fourth factor only has one question (I believe recent changes in government 
agricultural policy has substantially increased the risk of my farming operation.). Therefore, 
while it could be considered a government policy risk factor, it does not make sense to include 
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the factor in the multinomial regression because it does not add significant information and a 
factor should have more than one element. 
Factor loadings explain the variation each risk statement has on the factors and farmers’ 
decisions to adopt conservation. No specific criterion determines how high a factor loading 
should be to warrant inclusion in the analysis. If the factor loadings are too low, it may indicate 
they do not fit well with any factor, and have no effect on farmers’ decisions. Alternatively, if 
they are highly correlated with more than one factor, it becomes difficult to determine in which 
factor they fit better. For this analysis, factor loadings greater than or equal to 0.30 (in absolute 
value) are used to make inference about farmers’ risk perception effects on conservation 
adoption. Survey questions with factor loadings less than 0.30 (in absolute value) were dropped 
when calculating the risk factor variable for the multinomial logit regression (Greiner et al., 
2009). All the factor loadings are reported in Table 3.6 for comparisons. The dropped questions 
are:  1.“I have enough cash on hand or assets that can be easily converted to cash to pay all my 
bills.”, 6.“I spread the sale of my commodities over the year.”, 9. “Maintaining a low debt-to-
asset ratio is important to me.” and 15.“ I consider myself to be a low cost producer.” 
Factor 1, management risk, includes questions 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, and 18 from 
Table 3.6. These indicate farmers see using market information, maintaining machinery, 
spreading their operations geographically, having adequate backup labor/management, planning 
ahead, and using financial information in decision-making as risk-reducing management. 
Question 16 has a negative correlation of -0.328 indicating that being prone to making last 
minute decisions has an adverse effect on what might be called “good” management. Question 
18 asks about passing land onto the next generation and indicates the farmer is concerned about 
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the longevity of his/her operation and likely takes care to maintain property, land, and machinery 
while ensuring a financially sound operation. 
Factor 2, insurance risk, includes questions 3, 4, and 5 relating to life, medical, and 
liability insurance, respectively, from Table 3.6. In each case, the factor loadings are high, 
indicating the questions are highly correlated with the factor, as expected. In this case, the 
insurance factor shows farmers view life, health, and liability insurance as important risk-
reducing strategies.  
Factor 3, off-farm income risk, includes questions 7 and 8 from Table 3.6. This factor is 
important for farmers who depend on off-farm income to supply basic household needs. In some 
cases, these may be small farms, while in others, it may indicate poor management if the farm is 
unable to provide a living for the farm family, as indicated by the negative sign on the factor 
loading under the management risk factor for question 7. 
3.4.2 Multinomial logit regression results 
The multinomial logit regression was run with conservation practice bundles as the 
dependent variable while independent variables included the three risk factors, crop and CRP 
acres, the percent cash-rented land, self ratings of farmers’ adoption patterns and environmental 
versus profit concerns, whether the farm raised livestock, the area of Kansas each farmer is from, 
and soil-testing frequency. 
Table 3.7 contains coefficient results and model fit statistics from the multinomial 
regression. Coefficients should be interpreted relative to farmers only using no-till as a 
conservation tool, which is the most common response and considered the base response. 
Overall, the model has a reasonable fit with a Pseudo-R
2
 of 0.255 and a chi-squared statistic of 
63 
 
259 with 105 degrees of freedom, resulting in a p-value of 0.00 for the likelihood ratio test to 
determine whether the full model predicts better than an intercept-only model. 
While the coefficients’ signs are useful for interpreting an increased or decreased 
likelihood of adoption, the marginal effects prove to have more meaning with respect to 
probability of an individual making a choice (Greene, 2008) and are reported in Table 3.8. 
Marginal effects in a multinomial logit model incorporate sub-vectors of the estimated 
coefficients in each marginal effect. This implicitly includes the effects of choosing or not 
choosing other conservation practice bundles (Greene, 2008). Marginal effects show the changes 
in the probability that a respondent will choose any particular choice given a change in an 
explanatory factor. 
Marginal effects in Table 3.8 show that overall, risk factors have little effect on 
conservation practice adoption with only one statistically significant effect at the 10% level for 
the three risk factors and self-risk assessment question. The self-risk assessment, management 
risk factor, and off-farm income risk factor have no statistically significant marginal effects, even 
at the 10% level. These risk factors do not play a significant role in farmers’ decisions to adopt 
conservation practices. Off-farm income is not expected to influence whether a farmer will adopt 
a conservation practice (Davey & Furtan, 2008), but management characteristics should have had 
some impact on adoption. Management and off-farm income risk factors may have statistically 
insignificant impacts on conservation practice adoption because farmers view the potential risks 
as affecting their day-to-day farm operations and family livelihood. Whether a farmer adopts 
conservation or not has no impact on these activities in most cases. For instance, it is unlikely 
that a farmer concerned about having adequate backup management, spreading sales throughout 
the year, maintaining machinery, or locating fields in different areas will relate these to 
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conservation practice adoption. Likewise, it is unlikely that farmers will relate having off-farm 
income to supplement family living with conservation practice adoption. The personal insurance 
risk factor decreases the likelihood of adoption of the no-till with manure combination (NM) by 
about 4%, but the risk factor was not significant for any other conservation practice bundles. 
None of the marginal effects is significant for non-adopters (O). However, for those 
adopting cover crops, increasing crop acres increases the probability of adopting by 4.2%. 
Having Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) acres increases the likelihood of using no-till with 
filter/buffer strips (NF) by 32.5% and decreases the likelihood of using no-till and manure (NM) 
by 134%. 
The next variable in Table 3.8 is percentage of cash-rented acres. An increase in the 
percentage of cash-rented acres negatively affects the use of no-till (N) by itself, which may be 
an expected result given some landowners will not allow tenants to practice no-till if it interferes 
with the “looks” of a field (Carolan, Mayerfeld, Bell, & Exner, 2004). However, no-till is a more 
cost effective practice and cash-renters may look for natural cost-reducing practices on rented 
land (Watkins, Hill, & Anders, 2008). At the same time, renters put forth less effort to adopt 
conservation practices compared to owners with a long-term interest in maintaining their land 
(Lynne, Shonkwiler, & Rola, 1988). Increasing the percentage of cash-rented acres increases the 
likelihood of using cover crops (CC) in combination with other practices by nearly 11%. This 
may indicate that farmers see value in cover crops because they can decrease crop fertilizer 
expenses, even though they may increase herbicide expenses for no-till producers (Bergtold, 
Duffy, Hite, & Raper, 2012; Larson, Jaenicke, Roberts, & Tyler, 2001). 
Farmers with livestock are 35.5% less likely to use no-till (N) alone, but 29.7% more 
likely to use conservation practices related to manure use when including no-till (NM). Livestock 
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farmers are also 6.1% more likely to use no-till, manure, and filter/buffer strips (NFM). Other 
results for livestock producers are not statistically significant. This result is not unexpected since 
farms depending on livestock for a larger share of income will be less inclined to adopt 
conservation practices (Featherstone & Goodwin, 1993; Walton et al., 2012). 
Table 3.8 shows that considering oneself a first adopter decreases the likelihood of using 
only no-till by approximately 8.7%. While it may make sense that first adopters will be more 
likely to use no-till, it is possible that farmers who practice no-till have been doing so for many 
years and the practice has become more accepted. In addition, first adopters are more likely to 
use other conservation practices in combination with no-till rather than practicing no-till alone. 
First adopters are about 5.6% more likely to use no-till in combination with variable rate 
technology (NV). In addition, first adopters are more likely to choose some practice that includes 
cover crops (CC) by about 5%. These results are not unexpected because variable rate 
technology is relatively new and first adopters will adopt new technology as risk-reducing or 
cost-saving before later adopters (Boz & Akbay, 2005). 
Valuing conservation for environmental reasons and profit reasons can be different for 
different types of farmers. Early adopters may be less willing to adopt a practice if they are 
motivated by profits, while profit motives have little effect on late adopters’ decisions to adopt 
conservation (Läpple & Van Rensburg, 2011). Farmers who identify conservation as a priority 
on their farm are 7.9% less likely to adopt no-till and manure use, while farmers who place a 
greater value on profits than the environment are about 4.6% less likely to adopt conservation 
practices involving cover crops (see Table 3.8). This result is not unexpected due to potential 
costs of growing and inexperience with cover crops. 
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Regional variables indicate that, relative to Western Kansas, farmers in Central and 
Eastern Kansas are 30% and 19%, respectively, less likely to use no-till alone. These results are 
expected given annual precipitation falls from eastern to western Kansas and no-till adoption 
should increase in drier climates. Central Kansas’ farmers are 16% more likely to use no-till and 
filter/buffer strips (NF) together, as indicated by higher rates of CRP participation in Central 
Kansas. Farmers are 13% and 17.3% less likely to use no-till and manure (NM) in Central and 
Eastern Kansas, respectively. Central Kansas’ farmers are 11.5% more likely to adopt 
conservation practice bundle with cover crops (CC). Again, this is possibly due to farmers’ 
familiarity with soil benefits from using cover crops. 
The last variable shown at the bottom of Table 3.8 is soil-testing frequency. Decreasing 
the frequency of soil testing decreases the likelihood a farmer will adopt no-till with filter/buffer 
strips by nearly 3%. Coefficients for conservation practice bundles including manure use were 
not significant, which is somewhat unexpected since research has shown farmers should test soils 
before spreading manure to reduce over- or under application (Fuglie & Bosch, 1995). 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
This paper attempted to determine whether farmers’ risk perceptions affected the 
likelihood that they use conservation on their farm. Data gathered from an enumerated survey of 
Kansas farmers, which included conservation practice use, risk perceptions, conservation views, 
and farm operation variables were considered. Factor analysis was used to group farmers’ 
responses to risk perception questions and the resulting risk factors were included in a 
multinomial regression to determine the probabilities of adopting different conservation practice 
bundles. Factor analysis grouped the risk perceptions into three categories:  management risk; 
personal insurance risk; and off-farm income/investment risk. These risk factors play little or no 
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role with respect to farmers’ conservation adoption. Only the insurance risk factor was 
statistically significant at the 10% level, and had a negative impact on the likelihood of farmers 
using no-till and manure (NM) together.  
The insignificance of risk perceptions on conservation practice use is somewhat puzzling 
since it would seem that if conservation can ensure the longevity on their farm’s productivity, 
farmers would adopt. However, if farmers are profit maximizers in the short run, they may be 
less willing to adopt conservation if the monetary costs are high, regardless of the short-term 
environmental costs. Since these risk perceptions have essentially no effect on conservation 
practice adoption, it seems that farmers do not consider the types of risk examined here when 
adopting conservation, and consider other factors in their decisions. While not used in this study, 
it is possible that monetary incentives play a larger role in conservation adoption than an 
individual’s risk perception. 
Most Kansas farmers already practice some form of conservation tillage, indicating they 
recognize the need to conserve soil and moisture. Farmers who indicated they see themselves as 
a first adopter are more likely to use practices involving variable rate technology and cover 
crops, which is not unexpected since technology adoption is probably something first adopters 
will adopt and cover crops are not widely used in Kansas. Farmers who have livestock naturally 
practice conservation related to manure management. Central Kansas farmers are likely to adopt 
conservation practices possibly due to less irrigation use than Western Kansas farmers, and less 
rainfall than Eastern Kansas farmers receive. 
More work remains in the area of farmers’ risk perceptions and the effects on 
conservation practice adoption. This study attempted to relate risk perceptions to conservation 
practice adoption and found no relationship. It is possible that the risk questions were asked in a 
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way such that they do not extract farmers’ true risk aversion. Eliciting risk aversion through a 
different method may provide researchers with a better understanding of how farmers’ risk 
perceptions and risk management strategies affect conservation adoption. 
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics of self-risk assessment question. This is the first question in 
Appendix A3. (N = 283) 
Question: 
For your farm/ranch mgmt., how would your 
neighbors describe your risk taking behavior? 
N 
Percentage of 
Total 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1. An extreme risk avoider 5 1.8% 1.8% 
2. Cautious 104 36.7% 38.5% 
3. Willing to take risks after adequate research 143 50.5% 89.0% 
4. Not really concerned about risk 14 4.9% 94.0% 
5. Enjoy taking risks in my business 16 5.7% 99.6% 
6. A real gambler 1 0.4% 100.0% 
    
Average 2.77 
  
Standard Deviation 0.83 
  
Median 3 
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Table 3.2. Summary of risk-related questions. (See Appendix A3 for questions and types of answers required.) 
Question N Average St. Dev Median Mode Max Min 
1. Do you purchase federal or private crop insurance?a 287 270 
  
1 
  
2. Do you purchase insurance to cover hail damage to your crops?a 286 153 
  
1 
  
3. Do you keep a line of credit open at your primary lender?a 254 215 
  
1 
  
4. I have enough cash on hand or assets that can be easily converted to 
cash to pay all my bills.  
279 4.65 1.49 5 6 6 1 
5. I rely heavily on market information (for example: government 
reports, private market news services, extension) in making my 
marketing decisions. 
281 4.37 1.21 4 5 6 1 
6. I do have adequate life insurance. 278 4.34 1.63 5 5 6 1 
7. I do have adequate health insurance. 280 5.10 0.99 5 5 6 1 
8. My farming operation does have adequate liability insurance. 279 5.25 0.80 5 5 6 1 
9. I spread the sale of my commodities over the year. 277 4.69 1.09 5 5 6 1 
10. Off-farm income is important for the survival of my family. 279 3.53 1.81 4 5 6 1 
11. Off-farm investments are important sources of income for my 
family. 
277 2.81 1.52 2 2 6 1 
12. Maintaining a low debt-to-asset ratio is important to me. 279 5.03 0.93 5 5 6 1 
13. Most of my machinery is new and/or in good repair. 279 4.46 1.19 5 5 6 1 
14. I have fields in different locations to reduce yield risk. 282 4.28 1.35 5 5 6 1 
15. In case of emergency, I have sufficient back-up management and 
labor. 
278 4.03 1.39 4 5 6 1 
16. I  see myself as a person who plans ahead. 281 4.73 0.87 5 5 6 2 
17. I believe recent changes in government agricultural policy have 
substantially increased the risk of my farming operation. 
279 4.23 1.23 4 5 6 1 
18. I consider myself to be a low cost producer. 280 4.36 1.04 5 5 6 1 
19. I am prone to making last minute decisions. 279 3.38 1.23 3 4 6 1 
20. I use financial information in decision-making about my farm. 280 4.71 0.95 5 5 6 1 
21. Passing my land onto my children is important to me. 280 5.10 1.16 5 6 6 1 
22. D/A ratio categoriesb 273 4.69 2.37 5 6 9 1 
aIndicates a binary response. Only “yes” responses are included. 
bA total of 10 options ranged from “0%” to “over 90%”. The most common response was “20 to 29%”, and no one chose “over 90%”. See Appendix A3. 
Questions are asked on a Likert-scale from 1=”Strongly Disagree” to 6=”Strongly Agree”. 
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Table 3.3. Summary statistics for independent variables not related to risk perceptions or 
conservation practices. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Crop acres 256 1536 1380 0 8620 
CRP acres 256 36 111 0 1200 
Percent cash rent 256 33.4 39.3 0 100 
Livestock
a 
256 0.59 
   
Central KS
a 
256 0.38 
   
Eastern KS
a 
256 0.26 
   
a
Binary variables. where 1=yes, 0=no. 
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Table 3.4. Summary statistics for conservation practices. (See Appendix B3 for questions and types of responses required for each 
question.) 
Question N Average/Count St. Dev Median Mode Max Min 
1. Do you have a conservation plan for your farm? 277 227 
  
1 
  
2. I usually adopt new technology (e.g. no-till, new seed 
varieties, GPS, etc.) before my neighbors.
a
 
287 4.09 1.23 4 4 6 1 
3. Conservation of soil and water resources is a top 
priority in the management of my farming operation.
a
 
287 5.30 0.83 5 6 6 1 
4. Maximizing farm profit is more important than 
environmental stewardship.
a
 
287 3.31 1.18 3 4 6 1 
5. Conservation tillage (No-tillc, Strip-till, Reduced-till, 
Ridge-till) 
285 272 
  
1 
  
6. Cover Crops 285 28 
  
0 
  
7. Variable Rate Application/Field Mapping 285 65 
  
0 
  
8. Filter or Buffer Strips 285 62 
  
0 
  
9. Use of Manure 285 137 
  
0 
  
10. Cost Share for:  Conservation tillage  262 31 
  
0 
  
11. Cost Share for:  Cover Crops 28 2 
  
0 
  
12. Cost Share for:  Variable Rate Application/Field 
Mapping 
64 3 
  
0 
  
13. Cost Share for:  Filter or Buffer Strips 62 39 
  
1 
  
14. Cost Share for:  Use of Manure 130 4 
  
0 
  
15. Soil Testing Frequencyb 284 2.51 1.25 3 1 5 1 
a
Likert-scale response required. Responses ranged from 1 = “Strongly Disagree” to 6 = “Strongly Agree”. 
b
Responses were:  1=annually, 2=every 2 years, 3=every 3 years, 4=every 4 years, 5=never. 
All other questions are binary where 1 = “Yes” and 0 = “No”. The number of “Yes” responses is reported. 
c
Note that 221 (76.2%) farmers indicated they practice no-till on at least some of their crops. 
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Table 3.5. Use frequencies and percentages of conservation practice bundles. 
Conservation Practice Bundle Abbreviation Frequency Percent 
Non-adopters O 22 7.80 
No-till N 70 24.82 
Variable Rate Technology V 2 0.71 
Filter/Buffer Strips F 2 0.71 
Use of Manure M 16 5.67 
No-till/Variable Rate Technology NV 18 6.38 
No-till/Filter-Buffer Strips NF 16 5.67 
No-till/Use of Manure NM 54 19.15 
Variable Rate/Filter-Buffer Strips VF 2 0.71 
Variable Rate/Use of Manure VM 5 1.77 
Filter-Buffer Strips/Use of Manure FM 6 2.13 
No-till/Variable Rate/Filter-Buffer Strips NVF 6 2.13 
No-till/Variable Rate/Use of Manure NVM 16 5.67 
No-till/Filter-Buffer Strips /Use of 
Manure 
NFM 15 5.32 
No-till/Variable Rate/Filter-Buffer Strips 
/Use of Manure 
NVFM 4 1.42 
Cover Crop in Combination CC 28 9.93 
Total number of observations is 282. The percent is the number of farmers using each conservation 
practice bundle divided by 282. 
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Table 3.6. Factor Loadings for Risk Categories. 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
 Management Insurance Off-farm Govt. Risk 
a. I have enough cash on hand or assets that can be easily converted to 
cash to pay all my bills. 
0.2903 0.2027 -0.2346 -0.0905 
b. I rely heavily on market information (for example: government 
reports, private market news services, extension) in making my 
marketing decisions. 
0.3536 0.1338 -0.0172 0.1189 
c. I do have adequate life insurance. 0.0721 0.4704 -0.0122 0.2224 
d. I do have adequate health insurance. 0.1601 0.7813 0.1476 -0.1134 
e. My farming operation does have adequate liability insurance. 0.2177 0.5493 0.0524 0.0635 
f. I spread the sale of my commodities over the year. 0.2341 0.0093 -0.0910 -0.0065 
g. Off-farm income is important for the survival of my family. -0.1390 0.0073 0.8226 0.0953 
h. Off-farm investments are important sources of income for my family. 0.1819 0.1389 0.4251 -0.1596 
i. Maintaining a low debt-to-asset ratio is important to me. 0.1530 0.2184 -0.0951 0.2169 
j. Most of my machinery is new and/or in good repair. 0.4407 0.2430 -0.0679 0.0984 
k. I have fields in different locations to reduce yield risk. 0.4620 0.1247 0.1493 0.0235 
l. In case of emergency, I have sufficient back-up management and 
labor. 
0.6487 0.1007 0.0912 0.0275 
m. I  see myself as a person who plans ahead. 0.6370 0.2582 -0.0026 0.1315 
n. I believe recent changes in government agricultural policy have 
substantially increased the risk of my farming operation. 
-0.0210 0.0077 0.0698 0.5181 
o. I consider myself to be a low cost producer. 0.0714 0.1377 -0.0900 0.2634 
p. I am prone to making last minute decisions. -0.3284 -0.0272 0.0424 0.1734 
q. I use financial information in decision-making about my farm. 0.3004 0.1039 0.0025 0.1038 
r. Passing my land onto my children is important to me. 0.3257 -0.0345 0.0335 0.2871 
     
Eigenvalues 1.9621 1.4426 1.0058 0.6597 
Variance explained (%) 38.698 28.453 19.838 13.011 
Cumulative variance explained (%) 38.698 67.151 86.989 100.000 
Factor loadings ≥ |0.30| are shown in bold. Survey questions with factor loadings < |0.30| are not included in the regression estimation. In addition, Factor 4, 
government risk, is not included in the multinomial regression because the factor does not explain a sufficient amount of variation (eigenvalue = 0.6597). The 
shaded areas indicate questions NOT included in the multinomial logit regression. 
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Table 3.7. Coefficients for multinomial logit model of conservation practice adoption. 
VARIABLES O M NV NF NM NVM NFM CC 
Self-Risk 
Assessment 
0.0679 
(0.4725) 
1.6356** 
(0.5005) 
-0.0559 
(0.3427) 
0.1894 
(0.4506) 
0.0713 
(0.2799) 
0.3998 
(0.3873) 
0.2035 
(0.4217) 
-0.2097 
(0.3385) 
Management Risk 
Factor 
-0.2799* 
(0.1684) 
0.2163 
(0.1961) 
-0.2280 
(0.1883) 
0.0486 
(0.2054) 
0.1448 
(0.1226) 
0.1489 
(0.1714) 
0.0091 
(0.1827) 
-0.1136 
(0.1555) 
Insurance Risk 
Factor 
0.0746 
(0.2073) 
0.3379 
(0.2614) 
0.3656 
(0.2658) 
0.0367 
(0.2444) 
-0.1749 
(0.1464) 
-0.1639 
(0.1888) 
0.0864 
(0.2347) 
0.1721 
(0.1975) 
Off-farm income 
Risk Factor 
0.5290** 
(0.1896) 
-0.3954* 
(0.2219) 
-0.0344 
(0.1783) 
-0.1124 
(0.186) 
0.0625 
(0.1208) 
-0.1777 
(0.1767) 
0.1169 
(0.2006) 
0.05 
(0.1494) 
Crop acres 
-0.4841 
(0.4188) 
-0.4381 
(0.4478) 
0.2386 
(0.2488) 
-0.2044 
(0.3377) 
-0.0176 
(0.2014) 
-0.3879 
(0.3624) 
-0.4324 
(0.4468) 
0.3669* 
(0.2008) 
CRP acres 
-82.8193 
(68.2189) 
-121.7239 
(106.4828) 
-4.8232 
(5.6089) 
6.5119** 
(2.8291) 
-7.3261* 
(3.9716) 
0.0354 
(4.632) 
2.9247 
(3.9477) 
-1.4794 
(3.0893) 
Percent cash rent 
-0.6813 
(0.8667) 
-0.9697 
(1.0231) 
1.0741 
(0.8021) 
-0.4576 
(0.9556) 
0.6995 
(0.5533) 
0.8974 
(0.7654) 
0.3179 
(0.8282) 
1.4467** 
(0.6751) 
Livestock 
-0.0751 
(0.6343) 
2.1161** 
(0.853) 
0.5651 
(0.6481) 
0.4360 
(0.6795) 
2.1814*** 
(0.499) 
1.4257** 
(0.6973) 
2.1334** 
(0.8359) 
0.7677 
(0.5562) 
First adopter 
-0.2283 
(0.2954) 
-0.9402** 
(0.3691) 
1.4468*** 
(0.4078) 
0.3200 
(0.3424) 
0.1332 
(0.2057) 
0.4930 
(0.3238) 
-0.1758 
(0.3221) 
0.6756** 
(0.2747) 
Conservation 
Priority 
-0.6132* 
(0.3542) 
0.8751 
(0.6578) 
-0.3023 
(0.4721) 
0.8336 
(0.5861) 
-0.3497 
(0.2757) 
-0.0830 
(0.4534) 
0.6569 
(0.5061) 
-0.0306 
(0.3756) 
Profit vs. 
Environment 
0.2050 
(0.2672) 
0.6005* 
(0.3269) 
0.2525 
(0.2485) 
-0.0663 
(0.2807) 
0.0366 
(0.1816) 
0.0951 
(0.2699) 
0.1522 
(0.2683) 
-0.4372* 
(0.2316) 
Central KS 
-0.1435 
(0.791) 
3.6282*** 
(1.3913) 
1.2980* 
(0.7852) 
3.5686*** 
(1.0904) 
0.3121 
(0.5207) 
1.4614* 
(0.783) 
2.4028** 
(0.9656) 
1.9112*** 
(0.644) 
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Table 3.6 (continued) 
Eastern KS 
-0.1680 
(0.7603) 
2.7925* 
(1.4502) 
1.0275 
(0.854) 
3.1833*** 
(1.2269) 
-0.2699 
(0.5733) 
0.6437 
(0.9192) 
1.8669* 
(1.0314) 
0.7997 
(0.8199) 
Soil Testing 
-0.1080 
(0.2477) 
-0.1284 
(0.3382) 
-0.0327 
(0.298) 
-0.8708** 
(0.3555) 
-0.1614 
(0.1841) 
-0.1157 
(0.2896) 
-0.3197 
(0.2938) 
-0.3683 
(0.2547) 
Constant 
3.0444 
(3.3152) 
-17.4907*** 
(6.147) 
-9.8843*** 
(3.7422) 
-9.0194** 
(4.2238) 
-0.56030 
(2.3573) 
-4.6221 
(3.5814) 
-9.2184** 
(4.0304) 
-4.1908 
(3.1058) 
         
----------------------------------------------------Model characteristics---------------------------------------------------- 
Observations 252        
Log likelihood -377.76        
LR χ2(105) 259        
Prob > χ2 0.0000        
Pseudo R
2
 0.2553        
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Abbreviations are as follows:  O = Non-adopter, M = use manure, NV = no-till and variable rate technology, NF = no-till and filter or 
buffer strips, NM = no-till and manure use, NVM = no-till, variable rate technology, and manure use, NFM = no-till, filter or buffer strips, 
and manure use, and CC = cover crops practice bundle. 
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Table 3.8. Marginal effects for multinomial logit model of conservation practice adoption.  
VARIABLES O N M NV NF NM NVM NFM CC  
Self-Risk 
Assessment 
0.0001 
(0.0015) 
-0.0179 
(0.0547) 
0.0005 
(0.002) 
-0.0046 
(0.0133) 
0.0054 
(0.0152) 
0.0071 
(0.047) 
0.0281 
(0.0257) 
0.009 
(0.0209) 
-0.0277 
(0.0288) 
 
Management risk 
factor 
-0.0011 
(0.0026) 
-0.0116 
(0.0239) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0117 
(0.0078) 
0.0007 
(0.0069) 
0.0306 
(0.0206) 
0.0095 
(0.0113) 
-0.0011 
(0.009) 
-0.0155 
(0.0136) 
 
Insurance risk 
factor 
0.0003 
(0.001) 
0.0069 
(0.0284) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0175 
(0.0116) 
0.0020 
(0.0084) 
-0.0416* 
(0.0249) 
-0.0116 
(0.0125) 
0.0058 
(0.0119) 
0.0206 
(0.0177) 
 
Off-farm risk 
factor 
0.0018 
(0.0044) 
-0.0042 
(0.0238) 
-0.0001 
(0.0005) 
-0.0020 
(0.0073) 
-0.0046 
(0.0063) 
0.0137 
(0.0205) 
-0.0149 
(0.0116) 
0.0060 
(0.0102) 
0.0043 
(0.0131) 
 
Crop acres 
-0.0016 
(0.0041) 
0.0074 
(0.0383) 
-0.0001 
(0.0006) 
0.0117 
(0.0105) 
-0.0069 
(0.0118) 
0.0001 
(0.0351) 
-0.0292 
(0.0242) 
-0.0233 
(0.0214) 
0.0420** 
(0.0177) 
 
CRP acres 
-0.2786 
(0.4651) 
0.9036 
(0.6275) 
-0.0392 
(0.1224) 
-0.1187 
(0.2335) 
0.3247** 
(0.156) 
-1.3415* 
(0.7118) 
0.1788 
(0.3299) 
0.2895 
(0.2114) 
0.0813 
(0.2961) 
 
Percent cash rent 
-0.0039 
(0.0098) 
-0.1867* 
(0.1116) 
-0.0005 
(0.0018) 
0.0281 
(0.0334) 
-0.0341 
(0.0324) 
0.0630 
(0.0905) 
0.0346 
(0.0502) 
-0.0080 
(0.0403) 
0.1076* 
(0.0572) 
 
Livestock 
-0.0033 
(0.0083) 
-0.3555*** 
(0.0796) 
0.0004 
(0.0014) 
-0.0129 
(0.0264) 
-0.0152 
(0.0235) 
0.2970*** 
(0.0657) 
0.0383 
(0.0394) 
0.0611* 
(0.0343) 
-0.0100 
(0.0459) 
 
First adopter 
-0.0015 
(0.0038) 
-0.0872** 
(0.0403) 
-0.0004 
(0.0015) 
0.0563*** 
(0.0175) 
0.0039 
(0.0117) 
-0.0214 
(0.0359) 
0.0220 
(0.0214) 
-0.0220 
(0.0168) 
0.0502** 
(0.0236) 
 
Conservation 
Priority 
-0.0019 
(0.0049) 
0.0201 
(0.0596) 
0.0003 
(0.0012) 
-0.0115 
(0.0191) 
0.0328 
(0.0212) 
-0.0789* 
(0.0452) 
-0.0026 
(0.0303) 
0.0397 
(0.026) 
0.0021 
(0.0322) 
 
Profit vs. 
Environment 
0.0008 
(0.002) 
0.0049 
(0.0357) 
0.0002 
(0.0008) 
0.0121 
(0.0105) 
-0.0020 
(0.0094) 
0.0128 
(0.0307) 
0.0085 
(0.0181) 
0.0092 
(0.0135) 
-0.0464** 
(0.0198) 
 
Central KS 
-0.003 
(0.0077) 
-0.3009*** 
(0.0848) 
0.0015 
(0.0058) 
0.0170 
(0.0314) 
0.1597** 
(0.0793) 
-0.1297* 
(0.0712) 
0.0425 
(0.0537) 
0.0981 
(0.0656) 
0.1148* 
(0.0655) 
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Table 3.7 (continued) 
Eastern KS 
-0.0020 
(0.0055) 
-0.1901* 
(0.1004) 
0.0014 
(0.0053) 
0.0215 
(0.0412) 
0.2155 
(0.1348) 
-0.1727** 
(0.0746) 
0.0052 
(0.0613) 
0.0972 
(0.0872) 
0.0240 
(0.0774) 
 
Soil Testing 
0.0001 
(0.0009) 
0.0585 
(0.0376) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
0.0051 
(0.0125) 
-0.0270** 
(0.0129) 
-0.0046 
(0.0311) 
0.0022 
(0.0196) 
-0.0099 
(0.0146) 
-0.0245 
(0.0221) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Abbreviations are as follows:  O = Non-adopter, N = no-till only, M = use manure, NV = no-till and variable rate technology, NF = no-till and filter or 
buffer strips, NM = no-till and manure use, NVM = no-till, variable rate technology, and manure use, NFM = no-till, filter or buffer strips, and manure 
use, and CC = cover crops practice bundle. 
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Appendix A3 - Risk-Related Questions 
For your farm/ranch management, how would your neighbors describe your risk taking behavior?  (Mark one)  
 ___ An extreme risk avoider      
___ Cautious 
___ Willing to take risks after adequate research
   
___ Not really concerned about risk 
___ Enjoy taking risks in my business 
___ A real gambler 
 
Do you purchase federal or private crop insurance?     ___ Yes    ___ No 
 
Do you purchase insurance to cover hail damage for your cash crops   ___ Yes    ___ No 
 
Do you keep a line of credit open at your primary lender?    ___ Yes    ___ No 
 
Please rank the degree to which you agree with each statement below. 
Statement 
Rank from 1 to 6 where: 
     1 = Strongly Disagree;  
     2 = Disagree;  
     3 = Somewhat Disagree; 
     4 = Somewhat Agree; 
     5 = Agree;  
     6 = Strongly Agree 
a. I have enough cash on hand or assets that can be easily converted to cash 
to pay all my bills. 
1       2       3       4       5       6 
b. I rely heavily on market information (for example: government reports, 
private market news services, extension) in making my marketing 
decisions. 
1       2       3       4       5       6 
c. I do have adequate life insurance. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
d. I do have adequate health insurance.  1       2       3       4       5       6 
e. My farming operation does have adequate liability insurance. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
f. I spread the sale of my commodities over the year. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
g. Off-farm income is important for the survival of my family. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
h. Off-farm investments are important sources of income for my family. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
i. Maintaining a low debt-to-asset ratio is important to me. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
j. Most of my machinery is new and/or in good repair. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
k. I have fields in different locations to reduce yield risk. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
l. In case of emergency, I have sufficient back-up management and labor. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
m. I  see myself as a person who plans ahead. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
n. I believe recent changes in government agricultural policy have 
substantially increased the risk of my farming operation. 
1       2       3       4       5       6 
o. I consider myself to be a low cost producer. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
p. I am prone to making last minute decisions. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
q. I use financial information in decision-making about my farm. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
r. Passing my land onto my children is important to me. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
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For every $100 of farm assets you have, what percent is financed with debt? (Mark one)   
___ 0%  ___ 1% to 4%    ___ 5% to 9%  ___ 10% to 14%   
___ 15% to 19% ___ 20% to 29%
   
___ 30% to 49% ___ 50% to 69%   
___ 70% to 89%
 
___ greater than 90%  
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Appendix B3 - Conservation Practice Questions 
Do you have a conservation plan for your farm?     ___Yes       ___ No 
 
 
How do you agree with this statement:  (Please circle your response from 1 to 6)  
 
I usually adopt new technology (e.g. no-till, new seed varieties, GPS, etc.) before my neighbors. 
 
                               Strongly Disagree        1        2        3        4        5        6        Strongly Agree  
 
 
 
How do you agree with this statement:  (Please circle your response from 1 to 6)  
 
Conservation of soil and water resources is a top priority in the management of my farming operation. 
 
  Strongly Disagree        1        2        3        4        5        6        Strongly Agree  
 
 
 
How do you agree with this statement:  (Please circle your response from 1 to 6)  
 
Maximizing farm profit is more important than environmental stewardship  
 
                               Strongly Disagree        1        2        3        4        5        6        Strongly Agree  
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Indicate which in-field conservation practices listed below you use and whether you received cost-share, 
incentive payments, or income from using each practice from the USDA, Natural Resources Conservation 
Service (NRCS) or some other state agency. Then indicate the program in which you participated.  See the 
codes below for a list of NRCS and state programs. 
 
Conservation Practice 
Do you use this 
practice? 
If Yes, do you 
receive cost-share, 
incentive payments, 
or income for using 
this practice? 
If Yes, indicate what 
programs provided cost-
share/incentive 
payments.  
(List all that apply from 
codes below or write in.)   
Conservation Tillage 
(No-till, Strip-till, Reduced-
till, Ridge-till) 
     
    ___  Yes
 
  ___  No 
 
   ___  Yes
 
  ___  No 
 
Cover Crops 
  
    ___  Yes
 
  ___  No 
 
   ___  Yes
 
  ___  No 
 
 
Variable Rate 
Application/Field mapping 
 
     ___  Yes
 
  ___  No 
 
   ___  Yes
 
  ___  No 
 
Filter or Buffer Strips 
 
     ___  Yes
 
  ___  No 
 
   ___  Yes
 
  ___  No 
 
Use of Manure 
 
     ___  Yes
 
  ___  No 
 
   ___  Yes
 
  ___  No 
 
Other (specify) 
 
  
     ___  Yes   ___  No 
   
   ___  Yes
 
  ___  No 
 
 
Other (specify) 
 
 
     ___  Yes
 
  ___  No 
 
   ___  Yes
 
  ___ No 
 
Program Codes:  1 – Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP)  
   2 – Conservation Security/Stewardship Program (CSP)         
3 – Conservation Technical Assistance (CTA)  
4 – Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP) 
5 – Grasslands Reserves Program (GRP) 
6 – Farm and Ranch Lands Protection Program (FRPP) 
7 – Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
8 – Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) 
9 – State of Kansas Conservation Programs 
10– Other (specify):_________________________________________________ 
  
 
About how often do you have your soils tested? (Mark one) 
___ Every Year ___ 2 years ___ 3 years ___ 4 or more years ___ Never 
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Chapter 4 - Farmers’ Risk Perceptions in Stated Choice 
Experiments on Adoption of Alternative Cellulosic Biofuel 
Feedstocks 
4.1 Introduction 
 
A great deal of uncertainty surrounds development of a cellulosic bioenergy industry and 
markets. Production of cellulosic and other “second-generation” biofuels continues to lag behind 
U.S. federal government mandates requiring increased use of these advanced fuels. The 
Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS2) contained in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007 (EISA) mandated that 500 million gallons of cellulosic biofuels be produced in 2012. 
However, due to several production limitations, the Environmental Protection Agency reduced 
the amount to 10.45 million gallons based on actual production capabilities (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2012). Due to production uncertainty of cellulosic biofuel production, 
farmers may be reluctant to participate in new enterprises to produce energy crops. Without 
established markets and prices, farmers will likely be reluctant to produce cellulosic biofuel 
feedstocks. In addition, farmer perceptions about biofuels and renewable energy in general will 
further influence their decisions whether to begin producing a bioenergy crop. Traditional crops 
and livestock have well-established futures and spot markets as well as crop insurance so farmers 
know their production has an outlet, understand production risks, and are able to forward 
contract their production and hedge market risk. 
Underlying risk perceptions can affect an individual’s decision-making behavior 
regarding whether to invest their retirement savings in stocks or bonds; whether to lead a healthy 
lifestyle; whether to purchase insurance; business’s decisions about whether to invest in new 
technology; and farmers’ decisions regarding using government programs to manage risk 
(Chavas, 2004; Robison & Barry, 1987). Much research has studied consumers’ willingness to 
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pay for products, tourism amenities, or improved environmental conditions by taking account of 
consumers’ risk perceptions about food, product safety, environmental quality, etc. (Kamakura & 
Russell, 1989; Chintagunta, Jain, & Vilcassim, 1991; Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002; Dietz & 
Atkinson, 2010). In a similar way, perceptions about risk in growing non-traditional crops can 
play an important role in determining whether farmers are willing to produce bioenergy crops. 
The purpose of this paper is to determine how risk or other unobserved factors affect 
farmers’ choices in stated choice experiments about adopting alternative cellulosic biofuel 
enterprises on-farm under contract. This study uses a latent class regression model to determine 
if heterogeneity exists among survey respondents’ risk perceptions in a stated choice framework. 
Latent class models have gained popularity in agricultural, natural resource, and environmental 
economic research to determine how consumers react to environmental policy changes, choose 
park amenities, or adopt agricultural practices. Latent class models find classes within data that 
answer “unasked” questions and when the questions’ importance are unknown (Giordani, 
Schlag, & Zwart, 2010). 
Three important crops for cellulosic biofuel production are corn stover, sweet sorghum, 
and switchgrass. Each of these crops has its own unique characteristics that farm managers will 
consider when evaluating adoption of these crops. Corn stover as a bioenergy feedstock can 
provide corn-producing farmers with added revenue in addition to the corn grain. Sweet sorghum 
provides farmers with a familiar crop that rotates well with traditional crops. Switchgrass may 
provide farmers with an opportunity to produce a high-value crop on marginal land, or replace 
land currently used to produce hay or enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). This 
study will examine farmers’ willingness to grow these crops in a stated choice framework, 
subject to their perceptions about risks on their farms. 
89 
 
The next section is a brief literature review of research using latent class models to model 
preference heterogeneity among respondents in natural resource contexts. A description of data 
and methods are presented after the literature review. A discussion of results, conclusions, and 
implications follow. 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
Latent class models (LCM) have gained popularity as a way to model heterogeneity 
across individuals’ responses to stated preference questions. Early work using LCMs can be 
found in marketing research studies assessing consumers’ willingness to purchase products based 
on different brands or quality attributes (Chintagunta et al., 1991). Market segmentation studies 
also use latent class models. Kamakura and Russell (1989) found consumers can be segmented 
based on purchases when considering both price and quality differences. LCMs provide 
differences in demand elasticities for different types of consumers. For instance, Chintagunta et 
al. (1991) found consumers’ intrinsic preferences for different brands of saltine crackers affected 
own-price and cross-elasticities depending on whether consumers were loyal to a specific brand 
or more motivated by prices. 
 Dietz and Atkinson (2010) used a LCM to assess citizens’ willingness to pay for 
pollution control policies in the Southwark area of London, England. They determined that 
LCMs  provided better estimates than a conditional or multinomial logit model. They utilized a 
3-class latent model to determine citizens’ views requiring that polluters or pollutees pay for air 
pollution due to automobile emissions in the city. They found that the LCM was able to specify a 
type of respondent who was more concerned with mitigating effects of taxation on lower income 
residents and shifting the burden to polluters. The LCM isolated respondents who are more 
interested in an equitable distribution of emissions taxes rather than taxing specific groups, but 
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who may wish to minimize their own obligation. In other words, self-interest plays a role in a 
respondent’s choice, but it is not always observable to researchers. A latent class modeling 
approach can help define these differences across survey respondents. 
 Glenk and Colombo (2011) used principal components analysis (PCA) to reduce the 
number of variables in a stated choice study and included the PCA results in a latent class model 
to differentiate among survey respondents’ willingness to pay for climate change policies in 
Scotland. They found heterogeneity exists across survey respondents and that willingness to pay 
for climate change policies depends on respondents’ class. Their analysis has policy implications 
for carbon sequestering policies directed at farmers because policy makers should consider 
private and public costs before instituting policy due to resistance from certain types of market 
participants. 
 Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) included factor analysis in a latent class regression model 
study to determine how recreational users value park amenities in five Canadian/U.S. parks. The 
factor analysis grouped park attendees by their desire to get away from their routine for quiet 
relaxation, those who want to get away for a quiet weekend, those who simply love being out in 
nature, and those who love being in the wilderness for many days at a time. They determined that 
heterogeneity among individuals’ preferences changes welfare analysis for park attendees by 
including the four latent segments in a latent class logit model. They used results from the LCM 
to calculate compensating variation for individuals’ indirect utility functions, which helped 
measure the dollar amount park attendees should be compensated to maintain his/her initial level 
of utility. 
Bard and Barry (2000) analyzed farmers’ self-reported risk perceptions and found 
responses to Likert-scale based risk perception questions were correlated positively with 
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responses to scientific risk elicitation questions where farmers choose between different lotteries 
with different probabilities of occurring. The study shows that answering risk perception 
questions can approximate farmers’ risk-taking behavior under a hypothetical lottery, but also 
found that using more than one tool to model risk is often more useful than only one method. 
 Individuals have varying perceptions of risk, just as they have differing perceptions of 
how they value park amenities or societal issues. This paper will contribute to literature using a 
latent class modeling framework to assess farmers’ willingness to produce cellulosic biofuel 
feedstocks under varying risk perceptions. 
4.3 Data and Methods 
 
This section explains the data source, discusses the theoretical utility framework for 
farmers maximizing utility, and then presents the empirical model that analyzes farmers’ 
willingness to adopt cellulosic biofuel crops subject to risk perceptions. 
4.3.1 Data 
A stated choice survey was designed to assess farmers’ willingness to produce three types 
of crops for biofuels (corn stover, sweet sorghum, and switchgrass) for biofuel under contract 
with biorefineries or other biomass processors following Louviere, Hensher, and Swait (2000) 
and Roe, Sporleder, and Belleville (2004). The survey included questions about farmers’ risk 
perceptions, conservation practice adoption, and general information about their operations. It 
was administered face-to-face by the Department of Agricultural Economics at Kansas State 
University and USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), Kansas Field Office from 
November 2010 to January 2011. A total of 485 farmers in western, central, and northeastern 
Kansas with more than 260 crop acres and at least $50,000 in gross sales were contacted. The 
survey was tested on focus groups in August 2010, then with face-to-face interviews in October 
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2010. NASS enumerators were trained during a two-day training session and began interviewing 
farmers in early November. Interviews took 57 minutes (on average) to complete and farmers 
were compensated for their time with a $15 gift card. 290 surveys were completed and returned 
while 38 farmers were out of business or could not be reached, resulting in a 65% response rate 
(290/(485-38) = 0.65). 
The two parts of the survey utilized for data in this study are the biofuel feedstock stated 
choice experiments and questions regarding farmers’ risk perceptions. The next sections discuss 
each component of the survey in detail. 
4.3.1.1 Stated Choice Experiment 
Figure 4.1 shows an example of three stated preference questions farmers were presented 
with to determine which biofuel crop(s) contracts they would be willing to grow at different 
levels of returns, contract lengths, biorefinery harvest options, insurance availability, and nutrient 
replacement (in the case of corn stover), government incentive payments (in the case of sweet 
sorghum), and establishment cost share (in the case of switchgrass). Table 4.1 contains a 
description of the attributes and levels for each biofuel feedstock and Table 4.2 contains 
summary statistics for the stated choice experiments. 
The survey provided a brief explanation of each type of biomass production and 
explained the contract attributes before requiring a response to the set of stated choice questions 
shown in Figure 4.1. Survey respondents were asked to consider five independent choice 
scenarios with options to choose between two contracts or an “opt out” option, as shown in 
Figure 4.1. 
The choice scenarios contain two generically labeled contracts with attributed levels 
assigned randomly and an option to “opt out.” Following Louviere et al. (2000) a (14 × 13 × 22)2 
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fractional factorial design for corn stover, a (1
4
 × 1
3
 × 3
2
)
2
 fractional factorial design for sweet 
sorghum, and a (3
2
 × 2
3
)
2
 fractional factorial design for switchgrass were used to develop 90 
random choice sets for each feedstock in order to identify all main effects and any potential 
interaction effects between attributes and levels. The choice sets were randomly assigned into 18 
blocks (18 survey versions) and each respondent was presented with five choice scenarios for 
each biofuel feedstock (see Figure 4.1). The following is a brief discussion about contract 
options as shown in Table 4.1. 
4.3.1.1.1 Corn Stover 
Contract options were unlabelled and had four attributes for corn stover:  (1) Net returns 
per acre, (2) Contract length, (3) Biorefinery harvest option, and (4) Nutrient replacement option. 
Net returns is explained as the additional return on a dollar per acre basis for harvesting 
residue after costs are paid. The attribute has four levels:  $0, $10, $20, or $30 per acre. Since 
farmers already harvest corn grain, harvesting residue becomes an additional value for them, so it 
is plausible that they would harvest residue just to remove it from the field if it causes a problem 
with planting the following crop, and they have no cost associated with it. Alternatively, farmers 
may wish to earn money to compensate them for their time. 
Contract length had three levels:  2, 5, and 8 years. Because biorefineries likely want an 
ensured supply of product to produce biofuels after making a substantial investment in their 
plant, it may not make sense that they would offer year-by-year contracts. Therefore, the 
minimum contract length available was assumed to be two years, and up to eight years. The 
farmer would only have to supply the biomass if it was produced, and no tonnage requirement 
was assumed for the contract. 
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To add flexibility to the contract options, an effects coded (−1, +1) biorefinery harvest 
option is included as a binary choice that offers a custom harvest option at the biorefinery’s 
expense, but does not require the farmer to allow the biorefinery on their land to harvest the 
biomass. Net returns was assumed to include the cost of biorefinery harvest. Effects coding helps 
capture the grand mean of a utility function without confusing a base level mean that can occur 
when assigning dummy codes or usual (i.e., 1, 0) binary coding (Hensher, Rose, & Greene, 
2005). In addition, assigning a zero to the value would indicate the attribute is not included in the 
contract.  
Finally, the nutrient replacement option is effects coded as a binary choice indicating the 
biorefinery would (yes) or would not (no) compensate the farmers for lost nutrients (e.g., 
nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium) from biomass removal. It is difficult to know the exact 
dollar amount of the nutrients, so it was explained that the value would be negotiated annually 
depending on current fertilizer prices and the estimated quantity of each nutrient contained 
within the biomass. 
4.3.1.1.2 Sweet Sorghum 
For sweet sorghum, contract options were unlabelled and had five attributes:  (1) 
Percentage net returns above corn or sorghum production, (2) Contract length, (3) Biorefinery 
harvest option, (4) Insurance availability, and (5) Government incentive provision. 
Since sweet sorghum provides an annual bioenergy crop option to farmers and is a crop 
with which farmers are familiar, the net return value was presented as a percentage return above 
the next best alternative crop, which was assumed to be corn or sorghum. Farmers were asked to 
consider a “base” net return of $50 per acre and choose a percentage return above this value that 
may entice them to grow sweet sorghum as a biofuel feedstock. The attribute had four levels:  
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0%, 15%, 30%, and 45%. By using the percentage net returns above returns earned from 
traditional crop production practices, a market price for biomass can be determined using 
production costs and crop yields, without putting a precise monetary value on the biomass. In 
addition, using the percentage net return above corn or sorghum production will allow prices to 
“float” to levels that will entice farmers to adopt sweet sorghum. Farmers understand returns per 
acre, so asking them to indicate a desired return per acre is useful because many farmers are 
unwilling to make a decision to grow biomass without knowing production costs and actual 
dollar returns based on prices and yields. Then, a biomass price can be determined from price 
and yield combinations that produce the farmers’ desired return per acre. Policy makers and the 
biofuel industry will benefit from the survey results because they will know whether farmers are 
willing to supply biomass, while realizing prices required for farmers to adopt. The method 
benefits biorefineries by helping them determine prices they can afford to pay for biomass by 
knowing how much farmers require to make it a worthwhile enterprise. The attribute is recoded 
from a percentage to a dollar amount for analysis purposes. 
Contract length had three levels, the same as the contract length for corn stover. Since 
sweet sorghum production is similar to corn stover harvesting in that they take place on an 
annual basis, it is assumed contract lengths could be the same for both enterprises. Biorefinery 
harvest option was included as an effects coded variable, the same as in the corn stover 
experiment. 
Insurance availability is another effects coded binary attribute (+1, −1) indicating 
whether a crop-insurance type instrument is available for farmers to purchase under the biomass 
contract. The farmer would not be required to purchase the insurance, it is just provided if the 
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farmer prefers to use it in the event of a crop failure. The insurance instrument would function 
similar to crop insurance that farmers already use. 
4.3.1.1.3 Switchgrass 
The switchgrass experiment had five unlabelled attributes for each contract option:  (1) 
Percentage net returns above CRP or hay production, (2) Contract length, (3) Biorefinery harvest 
option, (4) Insurance availability, and (5) Seed cost-share provision. 
It was assumed that switchgrass would only be planted on marginal land (that may not be 
renewed in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)) or that is currently in hay production. 
Therefore, net returns above hay or CRP payments had three levels:  5%, 20%, and 35% and can 
be interpreted the same as the percentage returns in the sweet sorghum experiment. 
Contract length had two levels:  7 years and 16 years. Since switchgrass is planted 
approximately once every ten years, a producer may wish to enter into a contract length of at 
least seven years. If they choose to continue producing switchgrass, it is likely they would enter 
into a contract for 16 (or more) years. However, 7- and 16-year contracts allow a producer to 
discontinue switchgrass production if they chose to transition their land back into regular crop or 
hay production, or CRP. 
 An effects coded (−1, +1) biorefinery harvest option is included as a binary choice that 
offers a custom harvest option at the biorefinery’s expense, just as in the corn stover and sweet 
sorghum experiments. In addition, insurance availability is included as an effects coded variable 
just like that found in the sweet sorghum experiment. Finally, a seed-cost share attribute was 
included with three levels:  0%, 35%, and 70%. The high cost of establishing switchgrass may 
necessitate the biorefinery’s sharing in seed costs. The three levels indicate a percentage of the 
seed cost the biorefinery would pay under each contract scenario. 
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4.3.1.2 Farmers’ Risk Perceptions 
Respondents rated the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with certain statements 
designed to assess their perceptions about and reactions to risk on their farm regarding how they 
manage financial and personal risk related to their farm operation and family. The questions 
followed a format by Bard and Barry (2000) that elicited famers’ risk perceptions by asking a 
number of questions in a Likert-scale method. These questions were developed to elicit risk 
preferences about how farmers view potential sources of risk for their farming operations or 
families rather than asking questions about how they would enter into a risky situation such as a 
lottery. Risk questions included statements on their habits with respect to purchasing medical and 
life insurance, maintaining a line of credit, marketing, and using information to make decisions. 
Risk perception questions were asked on a six-point Likert scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 
6 = strongly agree. In addition, they were asked to answer questions regarding how they thought 
others viewed their aversion to or preference for risk, whether they used crop/hail insurance, kept 
an open credit line, and their debt-to-asset ratio. Appendix A4 contains the list of risk-related 
questions presented to each farmer. Table 4.3 contains summary statistics for the risk assessment 
questions. 
4.3.2 Methods 
A latent class model can be used to determine unobserved risk classes farmers may fit 
into when considering biofuel crop options. Using survey data and the approach following 
Boxall and Adamowicz (2002), a random utility model can be used to determine how risk 
perceptions affect farmers’ decision without focusing solely on the choice attributes contained in 
the study. Heterogeneous perceptions of risk and biofuels or biofuel crops will likely impact 
farmers’ decisions, and have important influence on the biofuel cropping options they choose. 
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Random utility theory considers a decision maker’s unobserved characteristics such as how 
farmers perceive risk as it relates to their family, financial situation, and their overall operation, 
as well as those observed by a researcher such as demographics and types of crops already grown 
(Train, 2003). The model assigns weights to questions based on their importance within the data. 
Giordani et al. (2010) found that a latent class model can separate survey respondents by risk-
taking behavior—that is, whether they are Bayesians (calculate probabilities of uncertain events 
and consider alternatives before accepting risk), risk neutral, or extreme risk avoiders. 
A latent class conditional logit model (Train, 2003; Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002; Breffle, 
Morey, & Thacher, 2011) is used to determine how farmers incorporate risk attitudes into their 
decisions for entering into a contract to produce bioenergy feedstocks. This model separates 
respondents into unobservable segments, or classes, that can explain differences across types of 
respondents (Train, 2003). Greene and Hensher (2003) tested whether a mixed logit, multinomial 
logit, or latent class logit model was best to analyze data from a survey of prospective 
transportation consumers. The researchers determined that both the mixed logit and latent class 
model were better predictors than the multinomial logit in this instance, but that it is difficult to 
determine whether the latent class model was a better predictor than the mixed logit even when 
the LCM was, statistically, a better model. Mixed logit models require specific parameter 
distributions about individual respondents while latent class models are semiparametric and 
approximate discrete rather than continuous underlying distributions. Due to these differences, 
either model is well-suited to estimating discrete choice models and researchers need to pay 
particular attention to their research question to determine which model is best. It is useful to use 
a LCM to separate farmers based on risk perceptions when determining their willingness to adopt 
new enterprises such as cellulosic bioenergy feedstock production. 
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4.3.2.1 Theoretical Model 
Risk in agriculture is often broken into production, marketing, and financial categories, 
but farmers’ personal perceptions vary within each category (Bard & Barry, 2000). Other 
categories of risk include price risks (input and output), personal risks (i.e., death, health, or 
family relationships), and institutional risks (i.e., government policy) (Meuwissen, Hardaker, 
Huirne, & Dijkhuizen, 2001). 
Following Roe et al. (2004), assume producers maximize expected discounted utility 
when they choose to enter into a bioenergy crop contract instead of producing a traditional 
enterprise. Then, producer i’s expected discounted utility for contract j will be: 
(4.1)                             
where    is a vector of contract attributes such as the additional net return above traditional crop 
production over time, contract length in years, custom biomass harvest option, a nutrient 
replacement option, biomass crop insurance availability, government incentive payments, 
establishment cost-share depending on which crop is analyzed, and    is farmer i’s risk 
perception factors. Due to variation in climate and growing conditions across Kansas, a fixed 
effects location parameter, Lki, is included to account for farmers’ location in the northeast, west, 
or central part of the state. Finally, the error term, εi,j, represents the nonsystematic (or random) 
part of expected utility that is unobserved by the researcher and is distributed Type I extreme 
value (Louviere et al., 2000; Train, 2003). Farmer i will choose the contract j = 1, … J, that 
maximizes expected utility:  i.e., 
(4.2)     
   
 
             
That is, the farmer will adopt the contract that provides the highest expected utility, such that 
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(4.3)                               . 
 
The change in utility,        , from adopting j is greater than adopting any   for    . 
4.3.2.2 Econometric Model 
 A LCM calculates the probability of respondent I from class q (q = 1, 2, …, Q) choosing 
alternative (contract) j from alternatives j = 1, 2, …, J while individual I participates in choice 
situation, t (t = 1, 2, …, T). The model estimates: 
(4.4)
                                                               
                                                                                   
         
    
          
    
 
   
  
 
where    is a matrix of choice attributes chosen by individual I and   is a vector of coefficients 
for individuals in class q. Following Greene and Hensher (2003), this can be written as 
 (4.5)                                     
 The probability that an individual, I, will fall into a certain class, q, in choice set t then becomes 
(4.6)               
 
    
 Latent class probabilities sum to one, so the model estimates Q – 1 latent class estimates. A form 
to estimate the class probability is a traditional multinomial logit form: 
(4.7)     
      
    
       
    
 
   
                    
Where Miq is the latent class constant probability, αi is a vector of respondent I’s characteristics 
and θq is the latent class parameter estimate (Greene & Hensher, 2003). Combining equations 6 
and 7 provides the likelihood that an individual will fall into class q: 
(4.8)                
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This model allows both contract attributes and respondent characteristics to determine the choice 
probabilities (Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002). 
4.3.2.3 Empirical Estimation 
4.3.2.3.1 Factor Analysis for Risk Factors 
Factor analysis is a useful tool for grouping respondents by risk attitudes because it 
reduces data dimensionality (Khattree & Naik, 2000). Some studies have used factor analysis (at 
least in part) to determine how farmers view risk in relation to production, marketing, 
conservation, and adoption (Greiner, Patterson, & Miller, 2009; Maybery, Crase, & Gullifer, 
2005; Flaten, Lien, Koesling, Valle, & Ebbesvik, 2005; Bard & Barry, 2001; Bard & Barry, 
2000; Akcaoz & Ozkan, 2005). Risk perceptions can be determined from a factor model. A basic 
factor analysis model can determine common factors that determine a relationship among a set of 
observations and reduce data to a manageable level. A basic factor model following Khattree and 
Naik (2000) is: 
(4.9)              
where z is a p × 1 vector of observations, or risk perceptions, f is a k × 1 vector with elements f1, 
…, fk which are common factors; L is a p × k matrix of unknown constants, or factor loadings; 
and ε is a vector of elements ε1, …, εp known as specific factors. Assume that f and ε are 
uncorrelated. Then, measuring a given    is considered a linear combination of factor elements, 
f1, …, fk and a specific factor,    as: 
(4.10)                                
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where     is the      
   element of L and becomes the factor loading, or coefficient, of    on the 
    common factor   . Then,  
   is multiplied by the z vector of individual i’s risk perception 
responses to arrive at a  p × 1 vector of risk perceptions, λ. 
Choosing eigenvalues greater than or equal to 1.0 is the most common method for 
determining the correct number of factors. Eigenvalues explain the amount of variance in the 
factors (Hayton, Allen, & Scarpello, 2004; Costello & Osborne, 2005; Khattree & Naik, 2000; 
Kaiser, 1960). Under this method, as long as the eigenvalues are greater than one, the factor 
explains a sufficient amount of the variance in factors to warrant its inclusion in the analysis. 
However, it is also important that the researcher be able to explain the factors and that the factors 
are reliable (Kaiser, 1960). Choosing reliable factors is left to the researcher’s discretion to some 
degree. If the factors make intuitive sense in helping answer the research question but the 
eigenvalue is slightly less than 1.0, it may make sense to include them to draw conclusions 
(Kaiser, 1960). 
Factor analysis separated the risk perception questions into four categories, or factors, as 
shown in Table 4.4. The first factor contains risk perceptions associated with management 
including production, technology, and marketing activities. Factor 2 includes using personal 
insurance as a risk response (insurance risk). The third factor included in the analysis is off-farm 
income/investments as important for family survival (financial risk). Factor 4, government policy 
risk, is included in Table 4.4 for completeness, but its significance is questionable because its 
eigenvalue is less than 1.0, indicating it does not explain much of the variance in the model. 
Eigenvalues for the first three factors are greater than or equal to one and explain 87% of 
the variance in the risk perception data across respondents. Larger correlations (in absolute 
value) determine where each risk statement should be grouped within the factors. If farmers are 
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concerned about production, marketing, and financial risk, the factors should group questions 
related to each type of risk (Bard & Barry, 2000). Meuwissen et al. (2001) found factors relating 
to farm family health, farm finances, legislation, production, and changes in farming situation to 
be significant sources of risk. Akcaoz and Ozkan (2005) found similar results with respect to risk 
factors associated with farm family health, finances, production, and government policy. The 
three factors listed above are similar in that they relate to production, marketing, and finances 
(management and off-farm income/investments), family health (insurance), and family financial 
well-being (insurance and off-farm income/investments). The fourth factor, government risk, has 
an eigenvalue of only 0.66, so it does not explain much of the variance in the data. However, as 
found in Meuwissen et al. (2001) and Akcaoz and Ozkan (2005), government policy is an 
important source of risk for farmers. Since the fourth factor only has one question (“I believe 
recent changes in government agricultural policy have substantially increased the risk of my 
farming operation.”) with a factor loading higher than 0.30. Therefore, while it could be 
considered a government policy risk factor, it does not make sense to include the factor in the 
multinomial regression because it does not add significant information and a factor should have 
more than one element if it is to have explanatory power as defined by its relation with other 
variables. 
Factor loadings explain the variation each risk statement has on the factors and farmers’ 
decisions to adopt conservation. No specific criterion determines how high a factor loading 
should be to warrant inclusion in the analysis. If the factor loadings are too low, it may indicate 
they do not fit well with any factor, and have no effect on farmers’ decisions. Alternatively, if 
they are highly correlated with more than one factor, it becomes difficult to determine in which 
factor they fit better. For this analysis, factor loadings greater than or equal to 0.30 (in absolute 
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value) are used to make inference about farmers’ risk perception effects on biofuel contract 
adoption. Survey questions with factor loadings less than 0.30 (in absolute value) were dropped 
when calculating the risk factor variable for the latent class model regression (Greiner et al., 
2009). All the factor loadings are reported in Table 4.4 for comparisons. The dropped questions 
are:  1.“I have enough cash on hand or assets that can be easily converted to cash to pay all my 
bills.”, 6.“I spread the sale of my commodities over the year.”, 9. “Maintaining a low debt-to-
asset ratio is important to me.” And 15.“ I consider myself to be a low cost producer.” 
Factor 1, management risk, includes questions 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, and 18. These 
indicate farmers see using market information, maintaining machinery, spreading their 
operations geographically, having adequate backup labor/management, planning ahead, and 
using financial information in decision-making as risk-reducing. Each factor loading has a 
positive coefficient except Question 16. This indicates that farmers value these statements as 
contributing positively as a way to lower risk associated with unexpected problems on their farm 
operations that may cause lower productivity or unnecessary harm to family members or other 
laborers. The negative correlation of -0.328 indicates that being prone to making last minute 
decisions has an adverse effect on what might be called “good” management. Question 18, which 
asks about passing land onto the next generation, indicates the farmer is concerned about the 
longevity of his/her operation and likely takes care to maintain property, land, and machinery 
while ensuring a financially sound operation. 
Factor 2, insurance risk, includes questions 3, 4, and 5 relating to life, medical, and 
liability insurance, respectively, relate to a farmer’s personal or family life rather than to the farm 
operation. In each case, the factor loadings are positive and indicate the questions are highly 
correlated with the factor, as expected. In this case, the insurance factor shows farmers view life, 
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health, and liability insurance as important risk-reducing strategies. The three components of the 
insurance factor are related to reducing personal or family financial responsibilities should a 
catastrophe occur on the farm such as death, dismemberment, or disease for a family member or 
other laborer employed on the farm. 
Factor 3, off-farm income risk, includes questions 7 and 8. This factor is important for 
farmers who depend on off-farm income to supply basic household needs. Signs on significant 
factor loadings are positive, indicating they positively contribute to the factor and relate to each 
other strongly. In some cases, these may be small farms, while in others, it may indicate poor 
management if the farm is unable to provide a living for the farm family. 
4.3.2.3.2 Latent Class Empirical Model 
This study’s primary interest is assessing how farmers’ risk perceptions impact 
willingness to accept a contract. To accomplish this, the focus becomes the reduced-form 
representation of expected utility. A main effects model (Greene, 2007; Louviere et al., 2000) for 
producer i and contract j of the farm is: 
(4.11)  
             
 
   
             
 
for each biofuel feedstock was used, where k represents the index of contract attributes:  returns 
per acre, contract length in years, a biorefinery harvest option, a nutrient replacement option for 
corn stover, an insurance option for sweet sorghum and switchgrass, a government incentive 
payment for sweet sorghum, a cost-share attribute for switchgrass, and location parameters for 
farmers in the three areas of Kansas.    is farmer i’s risk perceptions and      is a Type I extreme 
value distributed error term. 
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Latent classes are determined by the three risk factors:  management issues, insurance, 
off-farm income, and a binary variable where farmers were asked to indicate whether they have 
enough information to grow biofuel crops. A latent class model (LCM) captures correlations 
among choice alternatives in the model, which allows for relaxing the independent and irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) assumption found in traditional conditional logistic regressions but does 
impose IIA within classes (Greene, 2007). 
Equation (4.11) is modeled using a LCM regression in NLOGIT 4.0. The model uses 
simulated maximum likelihood with Halton draws using the Newton algorithm (Train, 2003). 
Predicted probabilities and farmers’ willingness to pay for alternative contractual features are 
calculated in a spreadsheet. Standard errors for all statistics using model results are calculated 
using the delta method following Greene (2008). 
The LCM is estimated with the contract attributes and farmer risk perceptions to 
determine how farmers make decisions amid unobserved classes. Risk factors (αi) for the LCM 
are shown in Table 4.4. Using these variables to determine the latent classes will explain how 
farmers’ risk perceptions affect their willingness to adopt a biofuel crop contract. 
Contract choices A and B represent the randomly assigned, unlabeled contract choices for 
each scenario, while Option C is the “opt out” option. As seen in Figure 4.1, Option C does not 
contain any attributes, so            and                          . This allows 
the model to control for unobserved individual effects associated with “opting out.”
 Assuming farmers are profit maximizers, the sign for returns is expected to be positive 
since higher net returns contribute to increased profit. Farmers likely prefer short-term contracts 
if they produce sweet sorghum or corn stover, but may prefer slightly longer contracts if they 
choose to grow switchgrass due to the long-term nature of perennial crops. Therefore, the sign of 
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contract length should be negative for corn stover and sweet sorghum, but may be positive or 
negative for switchgrass. The coefficient’s sign for biorefinery harvest may be either positive or 
negative depending on farmers’ views about biorefinery harvest being a cost-saving option, or if 
farmers are reluctant to allow custom operators on their property and location. The signs for 
nutrient replacement, insurance, government incentives, and cost-share options are expected to 
be positive since farmers will likely prefer a nutrient replacement option in the case of corn 
stover and insurance availability as a tool to manage risk, especially on “experimental” crops in 
the sweet sorghum and switchgrass cases. For the sweet sorghum and switchgrass experiments, 
farmers are more likely to prefer some type of government incentive payment or cost share for 
establishing a switchgrass stand. 
4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 Latent Class Models 
 As noted in Table 4.2, the largest percentage of farmers willing to adopt any of the 
cellulosic biofuel feedstocks were in the Central part of Kansas (69%, 75%, and 58% for corn 
stover, sweet sorghum, and switchgrass, respectively), while those in Western Kansas were least 
willing to adopt (41%, 49%, and 35% for corn stover, sweet sorghum, and switchgrass, 
respectively). Part of the reason for this may be because Western Kansas has more irrigated land, 
which is better suited to growing high-profit crops such as corn. In addition, the drier climate in 
Western Kansas may cause farmers to be less willing to remove residue because it can reduce 
moisture retention in the soil. In Northeastern Kansas, farmers are less willing to produce biofuel 
feedstocks since they are profitable producing corn and soybeans. Only 52%, 57%, and 34% for 
corn stover, sweet sorghum, and switchgrass, respectively, of these farmers were willing to 
adopt. Central Kansas farmers may be more willing to adopt switchgrass since they have less 
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irrigation than farmers in Western Kansas have, and are more likely to produce less profitable 
wheat and sorghum than farmers in Northeastern Kansas are. Sweet sorghum was the most 
popular bioenergy feedstock crop across Kansas with 60% indicating they were willing to adopt 
while switchgrass was the least likely to be chosen with only 42% indicating they would produce 
it. Just over half (53%) of Kansas farmers indicated they would be willing to supply corn stover 
as a cellulosic bioenergy feedstock. 
The corn stover, sweet sorghum, and switchgrass experiments have different numbers of 
latent classes but some overlap occurs in class meanings. Table 4.5 reports the results for the 
latent class estimation for each cellulosic bioenergy feedstock. The Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) were used to determine the number of 
classes to include in each model (Greene & Hensher, 2003; Breffle et al., 2011; Colombo, 
Hanley, & Louviere, 2009). However, the classes must also make sense with respect to 
respondent characteristics and estimated parameters (Greene, 2008; Dietz & Atkinson, 2010; 
Glenk & Colombo, 2011). In addition, too many classes can cause extremely large standard 
errors, which produce unreliable estimates (Greene, 2007). In all three experiments, the AIC falls 
when adding classes, but the BIC increases. A likelihood ratio test indicates additional classes 
are useful in all three experiments, but some degree of subjectivity still goes into class number 
selection, as noted above. The corn stover experiment has three latent classes while the sweet 
sorghum and switchgrass experiments have two classes. In the case of sweet sorghum and 
switchgrass, increasing the number of classes above two causes the standard errors of the utility 
parameters to increase to very high levels, indicating estimates may not be accurate. The number 
of risk factors included in the latent class estimation was varied to try to improve model fit. In 
the case of corn stover and switchgrass, all three factors and the biofuel information question 
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were included, but only one of the risk factors is included in the sweet sorghum experiment. 
Results for each experiment are explained in the next sections. Table 4.5 contains parameter 
estimates from the latent class estimation. 
4.4.1.1 Corn Stover 
The corn stover experiment has three classes. The AIC is slightly lower when estimating 
four classes, but the more restrictive BIC is lower when estimating three classes (Kamakura & 
Russell, 1989; Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002). In addition, class probabilities become very small 
(i.e., about 0.10) with more than three classes. This may lead to difficulties when explaining the 
classes, as very few farmers fit into each category. 
It is important to interpret latent classes against the base class, which is class number 
three in the corn stover experiment. None of the risk factors is significant for latent classes one or 
two. Given this result, it may make sense to estimate a conditional logit model, but this model 
may not account for unobserved heterogeneity among respondents. In addition, results from a 
conditional logit model may be similar to a latent class model (Greene & Hensher, 2003; Dietz & 
Atkinson, 2010; Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002) while a LCM may provide additional information. 
An important implication from this analysis is that farmers’ risk perceptions do not have a 
statistically significant effect on whether they will enter into a contract to produce corn stover as 
a bioenergy feedstock. It is possible that since farmers are very familiar with corn production and 
baling stover, risk has little or no effect on their willingness to adopt a corn stover enterprise. 
Signs for the utility parameters are as expected. Net returns, biorefinery harvest, and 
nutrient replacement all have positive signs indicating farmers in each class are more likely to 
enter into contracts with higher returns, a biorefinery harvest option, and a nutrient replacement 
option. Contract length has a negative sign, indicating farmers are less likely to adopt a longer-
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term contract to supply corn stover to a biorefinery. (See Table 4.1 for a description of the 
contract attributes). Farmers in classes two and three are less likely to adopt a contract if they are 
in Eastern Kansas. Farmers in Central Kansas are neither more nor less likely to adopt a corn 
stover contract than those in other parts of the state. 
4.4.1.2 Sweet Sorghum 
 The sweet sorghum model only has one risk factor, management, included in the 
estimation. Running the model with more risk factors or more than two latent classes produced 
large standard errors for most attributes. This may indicate the model should be run as having 
only one class (Glenk & Colombo, 2011; Dietz & Atkinson, 2010). However, decreasing the 
number of risk factors included in the latent class estimation provided more accurate utility 
parameter estimates. The AIC fell for each estimation with fewer risk factors until only the 
management factor remained. 
Farmers in latent class one are more likely to view management issues with respect to 
unknown problems on their day-to-day operations as important but do not necessarily handle 
them well. The negative sign on the management risk factor indicates farmers in this class are 
“not as good” at managing their operations relative to class two. An important finding here may 
be that farmers in latent class two are better farm managers, and more willing to adopt alternative 
cropping practices, as indicated by the significance of the utility parameters in class two. 
In latent class one, only contract length has a statistically significant negative coefficient. 
Not quite half, 42.4% of the respondents fall in this class. However, all utility parameters are 
significant in latent class two. Farmers in this class are less likely to adopt a contract if they are 
from the central or eastern part of Kansas. The negative sign on the central variable is somewhat 
unexpected since farmers in that part of the state plant more sorghum. Regardless of the area of 
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Kansas the farmer is from, they prefer contracts with higher net returns, shorter contract lengths, 
a biorefinery harvest option, some kind of insurance product availability, and a government 
incentive program. 
4.4.1.3 Switchgrass 
 Two latent classes were estimated for the switchgrass experiment. Risk factor coefficients 
for the latent class segmentations are not statistically significant. Coefficients for the 
management, insurance, and off-farm risk factors are close to zero, making it difficult to 
determine the meanings of the classes. This may indicate that, in general, these risk perceptions 
do not play a role in farmers’ decisions about whether to adopt a switchgrass enterprise. It may 
be that uncertainty and unfamiliarity with switchgrass production negates any effect of the risk 
perceptions if farmers are simply unwilling to grow switchgrass as a bioenergy feedstock. As 
noted in Table 4.2, switchgrass had the lowest number of farmers indicating willingness to adopt 
at only 42% compared with 53% for corn stover and 60% for sweet sorghum. 
Being from the central part of Kansas increases the likelihood farmers in latent class one 
of the switchgrass experiment will adopt switchgrass while those in Eastern Kansas are less 
likely to adopt switchgrass. Nearly 70% of respondents fall in this category. In class two, farmers 
in Eastern Kansas are less likely to adopt a switchgrass producing contract. Farmers in both 
classes prefer higher net returns, a biorefinery harvest option, and a cost-share arrangement, as 
indicated by positive signs on the coefficients. Contract length has a negative sign, indicating 
farmers may be less willing to produce switchgrass as the contract length gets longer. The 
insurance attribute was not significant for farmers in class one, but those in class two are more 
likely to adopt a switchgrass contract if some kind of insurance is available. It is possible that 
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overall, farmers in class two are more likely to be adopters while those in class one are non-
adopters of a switchgrass contract. 
4.4.1.4 Marginal Willingness to Pay 
 Farmers’ marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for contract attributes under risk 
perceptions is of interest to this study to determine whether risk plays a role in farmers’ 
willingness to pay for incremental changes in the contract attributes. Table 4.6 reports the 
MWTP under each latent class for the three bioenergy crops. 
For corn stover, the MWTP estimates are not statistically significant in latent class one. 
Latent class two respondents require $5.30 per acre per additional contract year to adopt a corn 
stover contract. These farmers are also willing to pay up to $7.81 per acre to have the biorefinery 
(or other custom operator) harvest their corn stover and up to $10.54 per acre to have a contract 
with a nutrient replacement option. Farmers in latent class three require about $1.01 per acre per 
contract year to enter into a corn stover contract. They are also willing to pay $5.25 per acre to 
have someone else harvest and $3.53 for a nutrient replacement option. 
MWTP estimates for latent class one in the sweet sorghum experiment are not 
statistically significant, and as noted above, the sweet sorghum experiment was run with only 
one risk factor. However, for farmers in latent class two, the contract length attribute MWTP 
indicates farmers will only adopt a contract if they are compensated $2.14 per acre per year of 
additional contract length. Similar to the corn stover experiment, farmers are willing to pay $3.67 
per acre for a biorefinery harvest option and about $0.25 per acre per percent of government 
incentive payments. 
Potential switchgrass producers in latent class one who are likely neutral with respect to 
how they view their risk-mitigating strategy, will require $9.01 per acre per additional year of 
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contract length before adopting a contract. This is in contrast to farmers in latent class two who 
only require $0.72 per acre per additional year of contract length to adopt a switchgrass contract. 
Given the long-term nature of switchgrass production and the options offered farmers in the 
contract scenarios, it is possible farmers in latent class two are risk-taking. The low value they 
require for entering into longer-term contracts to produce cellulosic biofuel feedstocks without 
an established market may indicate they are willing to try new enterprises under uncertainty. 
MWTP for the biorefinery harvest option is also very different between the two classes with 
farmers in latent class one willing to pay $11.35 per acre for a biorefinery harvest while those in 
latent class two are only willing to pay $1.33 per acre. Finally, farmers in latent class two are 
willing to pay $0.15 per acre for each percentage of seed and establishment costs the biorefinery 
is willing to share. 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
This study determines how farmers’ risk perceptions affect their decisions to adopt three 
cellulosic bioenergy feedstocks using a stated choice framework. The bioenergy feedstocks 
analyzed were corn stover, sweet sorghum, and switchgrass because of their availability and 
suitability for production in Kansas. Cellulosic biofuel mandates require increasing production to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and dependence on petrochemical energy sources, but farmers 
may be reluctant to produce these crops with much uncertainty surrounding production and 
marketing. Farmers answered questions asking them to choose among alternative contract types 
with varying net returns, contract lengths, harvesting options, and other options specific to the 
types of crops grown. In addition, farmers answered questions eliciting their perceptions about 
certain operation or personal risk issues. These risk issues were incorporated in the analysis to 
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segment farmers and determine if risk perceptions affect their decisions to adopt bioenergy 
crops. 
A latent class model was estimated to account for heterogeneity among individuals’ 
preferences for risk. Results indicate that farmers fall into different classes with respect to how 
they manage potential operational risk, depend on insurance or off-farm income and investments, 
and consider costs and government policy as contributing to risk on their farms. The class into 
which farmers fall can change the amount they are willing to pay for contract attributes. In 
general, farmers require compensation to enter into long-term contracts, but they are willing to 
pay from $1.33 to $11.35 per acre for a biorefinery harvest option, depending on the crop, and 
other options that might make bioenergy crop production less risky such as insurance, 
government incentives, and a seed cost share. 
Overall, risk perceptions had relatively no significant impact on whether Kansas farmers 
will adopt a cellulosic biofuel feedstock enterprise. For farmers considering a corn stover 
enterprise, risk perceptions do not affect decisions, likely because a corn stover enterprise is 
familiar to farmers and risk is not an issue for them when producing this feedstock. For the sweet 
sorghum enterprise, only the management risk factor was statistically significant and had a 
negative sign, indicating farmers may view this type of crop as an important cellulosic biofuel 
feedstock enterprise, and may be more willing to adopt this type of enterprise due to their 
familiarity with sorghum production. In other words, any type of manager would be able to 
incorporate a sweet sorghum enterprise into their farming operation. However, for the 
switchgrass enterprise, farmers’ unfamiliarity with the enterprise may cause their personal risk 
perceptions to be insignificant because they are simply reluctant to produce switchgrass as a 
bioenergy feedstock. 
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Much work remains to determine how risk affects decision-makers’ choices when 
answering questions in stated choice experiments. While latent class models provide a 
reasonable framework to determine how individual heterogeneity affects decisions, other 
methods may also provide useful information to help researchers offer insight to producers, 
biorefineries, and policy makers. Results from this study indicate that biorefineries should 
understand that not all farmers will be willing to enter into a contract to produce biofuel crops 
depending on their goals for their operations. In addition, it is important for biorefineries to 
understand that farmers’ risk perceptions do not play an important role in their decisions whether 
to adopt. Farmers may be willing to adopt cellulosic biofuel feedstock production as long as they 
know their production has a market. Farmers should understand that they have room to negotiate 
on different contract attributes. The hypothetical situations presented here are not the only 
combinations of contracts available. Nascent markets will necessitate flexibility on the part of all 
participants. 
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Table 4.1. Contract Attributes and Levels for Stated Choice Experiments for Corn Stover, Sweet 
Sorghum and Switchgrass. 
Contract Attribute Description Levels 
Net Returns (for all 
features of the 
contract except cost-
share and 
government 
payments) 
For Corn Stover: Represents the average annual 
expected net return above variable costs under the 
contract to the farmer on a per acre basis. This amount is 
received after all expenses are paid, including harvest 
and nutrient replacement. 
 
For Sweet Sorghum and Switchgrass: Represents the 
expected percentage gain under the contract above net 
returns associated with corn/sorghum production for 
sweet sorghum and hay production and/or CRP rental 
payments for switchgrass on a farmers operation. As a 
reference point, on average, returns from corn/sorghum 
production are expected to be $50 per acre and hay 
production or income from land in CRP are expected to 
be around $40 per acre in Kansas.  
For Corn 
Stover: $0, 
$10, $20 and 
$30 
 
For Sweet 
Sorghum: 
0%, 15%, 
30% and 
45% 
 
For Switch-
grass: 5%, 
20% and 
35% 
Contract Length Represents the time commitment in consecutive years of 
the contractual agreement. 
For Corn 
Stover and 
Sweet 
Sorghum: 2,5 
and 8 years 
 
For Switch-
grass: 7 and 
16 years 
Biorefinery Harvest “Yes” indicates the bio-refinery will harvest the biomass 
at their expense, and “No” means the farmer is 
responsible for harvest (including cutting, raking, baling 
and transportation to the bio-refinery). Harvest charges 
are included in the percentage net return. That is, the 
charges are considered paid regardless of who harvests 
the biomass. 
Yes or No 
Insurance 
Availability (Sweet 
Sorghum and 
Switchgrass Only) 
“Yes” indicates crop insurance is available, and “No” 
otherwise. 
Yes or No 
Nutrient 
Replacement (Corn 
Stover Only) 
“Yes” indicates the bio-refinery will provide the farmer a 
negotiated amount for lost nutrients (N, P and K) from 
biomass removal, and “No” otherwise. This amount is 
assumed to be included in the annual expected net 
returns. In other words, a “Yes” includes net returns with 
nutrient replacement costs accounted for. 
Yes or No 
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
Government 
Incentive Payment 
(Sweet Sorghum 
Only) 
This incentive payment is provided at two levels for 
production of cellulosic biofuel feedstocks delivered to a 
bio-refinery. The incentive levels are either none (0) or 
25 percent of the price per dry ton of biomass delivered 
to the refinery. The incentive received is in addition to 
the net returns above production. 
0% and 25% 
Seed/Establishment 
Cost Share 
(Switchgrass Only) 
Indicates a percentage of seed/establishment costs are 
covered or cost-shared by the biorefinery or processor 
during the first two years of production or after planting 
due to lower yields during the establishment period. 
Establishment costs can range from $150 to $200 per 
acre. This will be provided every time the crop is 
replanted. This cost-share is provided in addition to the 
net returns indicated above. 
0%, 35% and 
70% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2. Number and percentage of respondents adopting or not adopting a contract for a 
cellulosic bioenergy crop by region of Kansas. 
 
Corn Stover 
(N = 288) 
 
Sweet Sorghum 
(N = 285) 
 
Switchgrass 
(N = 284) 
Region Adopt Do Not Adopt  Adopt Do Not Adopt  Adopt Do Not Adopt 
West 41 60 
 
48 51 
 
34 64 
Central 63 29 
 
69 23 
 
53 38 
Northeast 49 46 
 
54 40 
 
32 63 
Total 153 135 
 
171 114 
 
119 165 
         West
a 
40.6% 59.4% 
 
48.5% 51.5% 
 
34.7% 65.3% 
Central 68.5% 31.5% 
 
75.0% 25.0% 
 
58.2% 41.8% 
Northeast 51.6% 48.4% 
 
57.4% 42.6% 
 
33.7% 66.3% 
Total
 
53.1% 46.9% 
 
60.0% 40.0% 
 
41.9% 58.1% 
a
 Regional percentages are calculated as number adopting or not adopting in that region divided by total for each 
crop in that region (e.g., “Adopt Corn Stover in West” would be calculated as: [41/(41+60)]*100 = 40.6%). Total is 
calculated as the number adopting or not adopting divided by the total number (N) for all three regions for each 
crop (e.g., “Adopt Corn Stover for Total” is calculated as [153/(153+135)]*100 = 53.1%). 
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Table 4.3. Summary of risk-related questions. (See Appendix A3 for questions and types of answers required.) 
Question N Average St. Dev Median Mode Max Min 
1. Do you purchase federal or private crop insurance?a 287 270 
  
1 
  
2. Do you purchase insurance to cover hail damage to your crops?a 286 153 
  
1 
  
3. Do you keep a line of credit open at your primary lender?a 254 215 
  
1 
  
4. I have enough cash on hand or assets that can be easily 
converted to cash to pay all my bills.  
279 4.65 1.49 5 6 6 1 
5. I rely heavily on market information (for example: government 
reports, private market news services, extension) in making my 
marketing decisions. 
281 4.37 1.21 4 5 6 1 
6. I do have adequate life insurance. 278 4.34 1.63 5 5 6 1 
7. I do have adequate health insurance. 280 5.10 0.99 5 5 6 1 
8. My farming operation does have adequate liability insurance. 279 5.25 0.80 5 5 6 1 
9. I spread the sale of my commodities over the year. 277 4.69 1.09 5 5 6 1 
10. Off-farm income is important for the survival of my family. 279 3.53 1.81 4 5 6 1 
11. Off-farm investments are important sources of income for my 
family. 
277 2.81 1.52 2 2 6 1 
12. Maintaining a low debt-to-asset ratio is important to me. 279 5.03 0.93 5 5 6 1 
13. Most of my machinery is new and/or in good repair. 279 4.46 1.19 5 5 6 1 
14. I have fields in different locations to reduce yield risk. 282 4.28 1.35 5 5 6 1 
15. In case of emergency, I have sufficient back-up management 
and labor. 
278 4.03 1.39 4 5 6 1 
16. I  see myself as a person who plans ahead. 281 4.73 0.87 5 5 6 2 
17. I believe recent changes in government agricultural policy have 
substantially increased the risk of my farming operation. 
279 4.23 1.23 4 5 6 1 
18. I consider myself to be a low cost producer. 280 4.36 1.04 5 5 6 1 
19. I am prone to making last minute decisions. 279 3.38 1.23 3 4 6 1 
20. I use financial information in decision-making about my farm. 280 4.71 0.95 5 5 6 1 
21. Passing my land onto my children is important to me. 280 5.10 1.16 5 6 6 1 
22. D/A ratio categoriesb 273 4.69 2.37 5 6 9 1 
aIndicates a binary response. Only “yes” responses are included. 
bA total of 10 options ranged from “0%” to “over 90%”. The most common response was “20 to 29%”, and no one chose “over 90%”. See Appendix A3. 
Questions are asked on a Likert-scale from 1=”Strongly Disagree” to 6=”Strongly Agree”. 
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Table 4.4. Factor Loadings for Risk Categories. 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
 Management Insurance Off-farm Govt. Risk 
1. I have enough cash on hand or assets that can be easily converted to cash 
to pay all my bills. 
0.2903 0.2027 -0.2346 -0.0905 
2. I rely heavily on market information (for example: government reports, 
private market news services, extension) in making my marketing 
decisions. 
0.3536 0.1338 -0.0172 0.1189 
3. I do have adequate life insurance. 0.0721 0.4704 -0.0122 0.2224 
4. I do have adequate health insurance. 0.1601 0.7813 0.1476 -0.1134 
5. My farming operation does have adequate liability insurance. 0.2177 0.5493 0.0524 0.0635 
6. I spread the sale of my commodities over the year. 0.2341 0.0093 -0.0910 -0.0065 
7. Off-farm income is important for the survival of my family. -0.1390 0.0073 0.8226 0.0953 
8. Off-farm investments are important sources of income for my family. 0.1819 0.1389 0.4251 -0.1596 
9. Maintaining a low debt-to-asset ratio is important to me. 0.1530 0.2184 -0.0951 0.2169 
10. Most of my machinery is new and/or in good repair. 0.4407 0.2430 -0.0679 0.0984 
11. I have fields in different locations to reduce yield risk. 0.4620 0.1247 0.1493 0.0235 
12. In case of emergency, I have sufficient back-up management and labor. 0.6487 0.1007 0.0912 0.0275 
13. I  see myself as a person who plans ahead. 0.6370 0.2582 -0.0026 0.1315 
14. I believe recent changes in government agricultural policy have 
substantially increased the risk of my farming operation. 
-0.0210 0.0077 0.0698 0.5181 
15. I consider myself to be a low cost producer. 0.0714 0.1377 -0.0900 0.2634 
16. I am prone to making last minute decisions. -0.3284 -0.0272 0.0424 0.1734 
17. I use financial information in decision-making about my farm. 0.3004 0.1039 0.0025 0.1038 
18. Passing my land onto my children is important to me. 0.3257 -0.0345 0.0335 0.2871 
     
Eigenvalues 1.9621 1.4426 1.0058 0.6597 
Variance explained (%) 38.698 28.453 19.838 13.011 
Cumulative variance explained (%) 38.698 67.151 86.989 100.000 
Factor loadings ≥ |0.30| are shown in bold. Survey questions with factor loadings < |0.30| are not included in the regression estimation. In addition, Factor 4, 
government risk, is not included in the multinomial regression because the factor does not explain a sufficient amount of variation (eigenvalue = 0.6597). The 
shaded areas indicate questions NOT included in the multinomial logit regression. 
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Table 4.5. Latent class model coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 Corn Stover  Sweet Sorghum  Switchgrass 
 LC 1 LC 2 LC 3  LC 1 LC 2  LC 1 LC 2 
Central 
1.3504 
(1.238) 
-0.2711 
(0.2015) 
0.1171 
(0.2595) 
 
1.2215 
(1.3927) 
-0.5081*** 
(0.1099) 
 
0.6323* 
(0.3874) 
0.1385 
(0.1751) 
East 
1.0694 
(1.2967) 
-1.2261*** 
(0.2128) 
-0.5498* 
(0.2823) 
 
0.7822 
(1.2496) 
-0.9987*** 
(0.1206) 
 
-0.8547 
(0.531) 
-1.2769*** 
(0.1744) 
Returns 
0.2255* 
(0.1385) 
0.0883*** 
(0.0072) 
0.1188*** 
(0.0084) 
 
-0.0128 
(0.0666) 
0.1299*** 
(0.0055) 
 
0.0728** 
(0.0363) 
0.1583*** 
(0.0121) 
Contract Length 
-5.5991 
(2.4119) 
-0.4752*** 
(0.0326) 
-0.1197*** 
(0.0316) 
 
-3.0472*** 
(0.8098) 
-0.2778*** 
(0.0152) 
 
-0.6563*** 
(0.0818) 
-0.1138*** 
(0.0113) 
Harvest 
1.5348 
(1.5623) 
0.7145*** 
(0.083) 
0.6219*** 
(0.0761) 
 
-0.227 
(0.5746) 
0.4754*** 
(0.0465) 
 
0.8266*** 
(0.227) 
0.2106*** 
(0.059) 
Nutrient 
Replacement 
0.8429 
(0.819) 
0.9303*** 
(0.0892) 
0.4366*** 
(0.0699) 
 
  
 
  
Insurance 
   
 
1.1456 
(1.0119) 
0.3179*** 
(0.0465) 
 
-0.0582 
(0.1729) 
0.2569*** 
(0.0619) 
Govt. Incentive 
   
 
0.0587 
(0.0425) 
0.0331*** 
(0.0037) 
 
  
Cost Share 
   
 
  
 
0.0155** 
(0.0063) 
0.0232*** 
(0.0022) 
---------------------------------------------------------------Latent class (θi) coefficients--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Constant 
0.5532 
(0.6185) 
1.3606* 
(0.71) 
-----  
-0.3193*** 
(0.1258) 
-----  
0.9884** 
(0.4662) 
----- 
Biofuel info 
-0.4600 
(0.3483) 
-0.4638 
(0.4306) 
-----  
  
 
-0.3077 
(0.2817) 
----- 
Management 
0.0608 
(0.0869) 
-0.0755 
(0.1057) 
-----  
-0.0020* 
(0.0011) 
-----  
-0.0101 
(0.0669) 
----- 
Insurance 
-0.0136 
(0.1136) 
-0.0142 
(0.1333) 
-----  
  
 
0.0072 
(0.0879) 
----- 
Off-farm 
Income 
-0.0533 
(0.0743) 
0.0862 
(0.0882) 
-----  
  
 
-0.0021 
(0.0582) 
----- 
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Table 4.5 (continued) 
Class 
probabilities 
0.486 0.306 0.208 
 
0.424 0.576 
 
0.697 0.303 
---------------------------------------------------------------------Model Statistics--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of 
Observations 
1435  1425  1420 
AIC 1.088  1.255  1.004 
McFadden 
Pseudo-R
2
 
0.5228  0.4391  0.5553 
Log-likelihood -752.333  -875.035  -693.726 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.6. Willingness to pay for contract attributes within the latent classes. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 Corn Stover  Sweet Sorghum  Switchgrass 
 LC 1 LC 2 LC 3  LC 1 LC 2  LC 1 LC 2 
Contract Length 
-27.25 
(19.95) 
-5.30*** 
(0.35) 
-1.01*** 
(0.25) 
 
238.20 
(1254.28) 
-2.14*** 
(0.11) 
 
-9.01*** 
(3.85) 
-0.72*** 
(0.06) 
Harvest 
10.82 
(36.27) 
7.81*** 
(1.00) 
5.25*** 
(0.58) 
 
17.74 
(101.06) 
3.66*** 
(0.35) 
 
11.35* 
(6.10) 
1.33*** 
(0.37) 
Nutrient 
Replacement 
3.83 
(3.45) 
10.54*** 
(1.15) 
3.53*** 
(0.64) 
 
  
 
  
Insurance 
   
 
-89.55 
(481.13) 
0.41 
(0.36) 
 
-0.80 
(2.44) 
0.62 
(0.39) 
Govt. Incentive 
   
 
-4.59 
(23.87) 
0.25*** 
(0.03) 
 
  
Cost Share 
   
 
  
 
0.21 
(0.13) 
0.15*** 
(0.01) 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Figure 4.1. Stated choice scenarios for corn stover, sweet sorghum, and switchgrass. 
Corn Stover Scenario Contract A Contract B Option C 
C
o
n
tr
ac
t 
F
ea
tu
re
s Net Returns $20/acre/year $30/acre/year 
Do Not 
Adopt 
Contract Length 2 years 8 years 
Biorefinery  
Harvest 
Yes Yes 
Nutrient Replacement No Yes 
 
Your Ranking 
(1-3) 
   
 
 
 
Sweet sorghum Scenario Contract A Contract B Option C 
C
o
n
tr
ac
t 
F
ea
tu
re
s 
Net Return Above 
Sorghum/Corn Production 
(Base: $50/ac) 
45% Higher/year 0% Higher/year 
Do Not 
Adopt 
Contract Length 5 Years 2 Years 
Biorefinery Harvest No Yes 
Insurance Availability Yes No 
Gov. Incentive Payment None None 
 Your Ranking 
(1-3) 
   
 
 
 
Switchgrass Scenario Contract A Contract B Option C 
C
o
n
tr
ac
t 
F
ea
tu
re
s 
Net Return Above Hay 
Production/CRP Rental 
Rates  
(Base: $40/ac) 
5% Higher/year 20% Higher/year 
Do Not Adopt 
Contract Length 7 Years 16 Years 
Biorefinery Harvest No Yes 
Insurance Available Yes Yes 
Seed/Establishment 
Cost-Share 
35% None 
 Your Ranking 
(1-3) 
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Appendix A4 - Risk-Related Questions 
For your farm/ranch management, how would your neighbors describe your risk taking behavior? 
(Mark one)  
 ___ An extreme risk avoider      
___ Cautious 
___ Willing to take risks after adequate research
   
___ Not really concerned about risk 
___ Enjoy taking risks in my business 
___ A real gambler 
 
Do you purchase federal or private crop insurance?    ___ Yes    ___ No 
 
Do you purchase insurance to cover hail damage for your cash crops  ___ Yes    ___ No 
 
Do you keep a line of credit open at your primary lender?   ___ Yes    ___ No 
 
Please rank the degree to which you agree with each statement below. 
Statement 
Rank from 1 to 6 where: 
     1 = Strongly Disagree;  
     2 = Disagree;  
     3 = Somewhat Disagree; 
     4 = Somewhat Agree; 
     5 = Agree;  
     6 = Strongly Agree 
a. I have enough cash on hand or assets that can be easily converted to cash 
to pay all my bills. 
1       2       3       4       5       6 
b. I rely heavily on market information (for example: government reports, 
private market news services, extension) in making my marketing 
decisions. 
1       2       3       4       5       6 
c. I do have adequate life insurance. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
d. I do have adequate health insurance.  1       2       3       4       5       6 
e. My farming operation does have adequate liability insurance. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
f. I spread the sale of my commodities over the year. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
g. Off-farm income is important for the survival of my family. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
h. Off-farm investments are important sources of income for my family. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
i. Maintaining a low debt-to-asset ratio is important to me. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
j. Most of my machinery is new and/or in good repair. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
k. I have fields in different locations to reduce yield risk. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
l. In case of emergency, I have sufficient back-up management and labor. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
m. I  see myself as a person who plans ahead. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
n. I believe recent changes in government agricultural policy have 
substantially increased the risk of my farming operation. 
1       2       3       4       5       6 
o. I consider myself to be a low cost producer. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
p. I am prone to making last minute decisions. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
q. I use financial information in decision-making about my farm. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
r. Passing my land onto my children is important to me. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
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For every $100 of farm assets you have, what percent is financed with debt? (Mark one)   
___ 0%  ___ 1% to 4%    ___ 5% to 9%  ___ 10% to 14%   
___ 15% to 19% ___ 20% to 29%
   
___ 30% to 49% ___ 50% to 69%   
___ 70% to 89%
 
___ greater than 90%  
 
 
129 
 
Chapter 5 - Conclusions and Implications for Further Research 
This dissertation contains three essays on Kansas farmers’ willingness to adopt cellulosic 
biofuel feedstocks and conservation practices. Production of advanced and lignocellulosic 
biofuel feedstocks will become important as the United States attempts to become more energy 
independent while reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Farm land across Kansas provides 
a good source of cellulosic biomass for bioenergy in the forms of corn stover, wheat straw, sweet 
or forage sorghum, hay, alfalfa, or biomass from conservation reserve program (CRP) acres. This 
dissertation had three purposes. First, it attempted to determine whether farmers in Kansas would 
be willing to produce switchgrass as cellulosic biofuel feedstocks under contract. Second, it 
attempted to determine how farmers’ risk perceptions influence their decisions to adopt 
conservation practices on their farms. Third, it attempted to determine whether farmers would 
supply three types of biomass, corn stover, sweet sorghum, and switchgrass, under contract 
subject to their risk perceptions. 
Data for the dissertation consist of results from a stated preference study administered by 
the Department of Agricultural Economics at Kansas State University and the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service Kansas Field Office. The survey gathered information from 290 
farmers across Kansas including the number of acres in each farmer’s operation; the amount of 
rented land they farm; the types of crops and livestock they produce along with yields and crop 
rotation patterns; a stated choice section asking their willingness to produce bioenergy 
feedstocks; their perceptions about biofuels from production and policy perspectives; the 
conservation practices they use on their farms; their perceptions about and how they manage 
potential sources of risk for their farm operations and families, and personal demographic 
characteristics. 
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Essay 1, “Farmers’ Willingness to Grow Switchgrass as a Cellulosic Bioenergy Crop:  A 
Stated Choice Approach,” used stated preference data from the survey and a latent class model, 
which is a special case of a multinomial logistic regression, to determine farmers’ willingness to 
produce switchgrass as a cellulosic biofuel feedstock under contract. Two latent classes were 
found in the data determining that heterogeneity across respondents exists for non-adopters and 
adopters. Results show that contract attributes positively affecting farmers’ decisions. These 
attributes include net returns, biorefinery harvest options, insurance availability, and seed cost-
share assistance. Contract length negatively affects farmers’ decisions on which contract to 
choose, indicating they prefer shorter-term contracts. However, adopters are more likely to enter 
into a switchgrass contract than non-adopters and are more willing to pay more for a biorefinery 
harvest option, but require more compensation to enter into long-term contracts.  
 Marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) estimates show that contract length is an important 
attribute (maybe the most important attribute) in determining whether a farmer will produce 
switchgrass for bioenergy for each latent class. In each class, farmers require some payment 
ranging from $9.33 (for adopters) to $0.72 (for non-adopters) per acre per additional year of 
contract length to produce switchgrass for bioenergy. In addition, farmers see a seed-cost share 
arrangement as beneficial to entering into a switchgrass producing contract and non-adopters are 
willing to pay about $0.15 per acre per percentage point increase in the share of establishment 
costs paid by the biorefinery. 
While switchgrass has great potential to help reduce the nation’s dependence on 
nonrenewable sources of energy, much uncertainty exists as to its viability in Kansas. A primary 
area of further research is to determine how bioenergy crop characteristics, storage, and 
transportation issues affect farmers’ decisions to grow a bioenergy crops. Risk aversion is also 
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important when assessing farmers’ willingness to adopt new technology or practices and could 
affect their decisions. The latent class logit model presented here attempts to control for these, 
but it does not help explain how farmers base their decisions because of these characteristics 
specifically. 
Essay 2, “Farmer Risk Perceptions and Conservation Practice Adoption,” used factor 
analysis to reduce data on farmers’ risk perceptions to a reasonable size. Factor analysis found 
three important risk factors relating to farm operation management, insurance as a risk reducing 
strategy, and off-farm income as a risk reducing strategy for farmers’ families. The risk factors 
were included in a multinomial logistic regression as independent variables along with farm 
characteristics to determine how farmers adopted conservation practice bundles. 
Most Kansas farmers already practice some form of conservation tillage, indicating they 
recognize the need to conserve soil and moisture. Farmers who indicated they see themselves as 
a first adopter are more likely to use practices involving variable rate technology and cover 
crops, which is not unexpected since technology adoption is probably something first adopters 
will adopt and cover crops are not widely used in Kansas. Farmers who have livestock naturally 
practice conservation related to manure management. Central Kansas farmers are likely to adopt 
conservation practices possibly due to less irrigation use than Western Kansas farmers, and less 
rainfall than Eastern Kansas farmers receive. 
Results show that, while risk factors were not significant in determining why farmers 
choose conservation practices on their farms, other variables do play a role in farmers’ decisions 
whether to adopt. The risk perception related to insurance was the only statistically significant 
risk perception for farmers adopting a no-till/manure use conservation practice bundle. The 
insignificance of risk perceptions on conservation practice use is somewhat puzzling since it 
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would seem that if conservation can ensure the longevity on their farm’s productivity, farmers 
would adopt. However, if farmers are profit maximizers in the short run, they may be less willing 
to adopt conservation if the monetary costs are high, regardless of the short-term environmental 
costs. Since these risk perceptions have essentially no effect on conservation practice adoption, it 
seems that farmers do not consider the types of risk examined here when adopting conservation 
and consider other factors in their decisions. While not used in this study, it is possible that 
monetary incentives play a larger role in conservation adoption than an individual’s risk 
perception. 
More work remains in the area of farmers’ risk perceptions and the effects on 
conservation practice adoption. This study attempted to relate risk perceptions to conservation 
practice adoption and found no relationship. It is possible that the risk questions were asked in a 
way such that they do not extract farmers’ true risk aversion. Eliciting risk aversion through a 
different method may provide researchers with a better understanding of how farmers’ risk 
perceptions and risk management strategies affect conservation adoption. 
Essay 3, “Farmers’ Risk Perceptions in Stated Choice Experiments on Adoption of 
Alternative Cellulosic Biofuel Feedstocks,” used the three risk factors (management risk, 
insurance risk, and off-farm income risk) from Essay 2 to determine how farmers’ risk 
perceptions affect their decisions to adopt three cellulosic bioenergy feedstocks under contract 
using a stated choice framework. The study incorporated the risk factors into a latent class 
model, similar to Essay 1 to assess heterogeneity across survey respondents based on their risk 
perceptions. 
The bioenergy feedstocks analyzed were corn stover, sweet sorghum, and switchgrass 
because of their availability and suitability for production in Kansas. Results indicate that 
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farmers fall into different classes with respect to how they manage potential operational risk, 
depend on insurance or off-farm income and investments, and consider costs and government 
policy as contributing to risk on their farms. The class into which farmers fall can change the 
amount they are willing to pay for contract attributes. In general, farmers require compensation 
to enter into long-term contracts, but they are willing to pay from $1.33 to $11.35 per acre for a 
biorefinery harvest option, depending on the crop, and other options that might make bioenergy 
crop production less risky such as insurance, government incentives, and a seed cost share. 
Overall, risk perceptions had no significant impact on whether Kansas farmers will adopt 
a cellulosic biofuel feedstock enterprise, similar to the results from Essay 2. For farmers 
considering a corn stover enterprise, risk perceptions do not affect decisions, likely because a 
corn stover enterprise is familiar to farmers and risk is not an issue for them should they choos to 
produce this feedstock. For the sweet sorghum enterprise, only the management risk factor was 
statistically significant and had a negative sign, indicating farmers may view this type of crop as 
an important cellulosic biofuel feedstock enterprise, and may be more willing to adopt this type 
of enterprise due to their familiarity with sorghum production. In other words, any type of 
manager would be able to incorporate a sweet sorghum enterprise into their farming operation. 
However, for the switchgrass enterprise, farmers’ unfamiliarity with the enterprise may cause 
their personal risk perceptions to be irrelevant because they are simply too reluctant to produce 
switchgrass as a bioenergy feedstock. 
Much work remains to determine how risk affects decision-makers’ choices when 
answering questions in stated choice experiments. While latent class models provide a 
reasonable framework to determine how individual heterogeneity affects decisions, other 
methods such as random parameters models may provide useful information to help researchers 
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offer insight to producers, biorefineries, and policy makers about the potential costs and gains of 
a cellulosic biofuel feedstock industry. Results from this study indicate that biorefineries should 
understand that not all farmers would be willing to enter into a contract to produce biofuel crops 
depending on their goals for their operations. In addition, it is important for biorefineries to 
understand that farmers’ risk perceptions as asked here do not play an important role in their 
decisions whether to adopt. Farmers may be willing to adopt cellulosic biofuel feedstock 
production as long as they know their production has a market. Farmers should understand that 
they have room to negotiate different contract attributes. The hypothetical situations presented 
here are not the only combinations of contracts available. Nascent markets will necessitate 
flexibility on the part of all participants. 
Overall results from this dissertation indicate that farmers’ decision-making 
characteristics bear further study. While risk enters into farmers’ decisions, results from this 
study indicate their perceptions about risk are relatively unimportant with respect to adopting 
cellulosic biofuel feedstocks or conservation practices. One reason for this may be that crop 
farmers are relatively “comfortable” growing corn, soybeans, wheat, and sorghum when profits 
for these crops are high. Another reason may be that farmers have more risk management tools 
available to reduce yield and price risk, so they are less concerned with potential risks presented 
in this study.  
Further research includes asking farmers risk perception questions along with risk 
elicitation questions to attempt to trace out a risk aversion frontier. Having a more complete 
understanding of farmers’ risk aversion may help determine how risk enters into decisions about 
adopting new crop or livestock enterprises, new technology, or new crop insurance instruments. 
